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Abstract
“Separate but equal” legally sanctioned segregation in public schools
until Brown. Ever since, separate but free has been the prevailing dogma
excusing segregation. From “freedom of choice” plans that facilitated
massive resistance to desegregation to current school choice plans
exacerbating racial, socioeconomic, and disability segregation,
proponents have venerated parental freedom as the overriding principle.
This Article contends that, in the field of public education, the dogma
of separate but free has no place; separate is inherently unfree. As this
Article uniquely clarifies, segregation deprives schoolchildren of
freedom to become equal citizens and freedom to learn in democratic,
integrated, and transformative settings. We must name and reclaim these
positive, social, emancipatory freedoms—envisioned by the framers of
state constitution education clauses, developed by early progressives,
reflected in the case law, and applied in “freedom schools” and by
Southern Black teachers during the Civil Rights Era.
School choice practices that sustain and intensify segregation
arbitrarily deprive children of these freedoms and thus offend due process
guarantees in state constitutions. Antebellum state courts were the
progenitors of substantive due process, prohibiting arbitrary deprivations
of vested rights and voiding class legislation that conferred special
benefits or imposed unique burdens, which did not serve legitimate,
public purposes. This Article is the first to propose revitalizing state due
process guarantees to resist segregative school choice practices in asapplied challenges.
Amid a pandemic, legislators are advancing bills which exploit the
specious rhetoric of public-school failures and angst about the modes of
instruction to expand schools of choice. But parental freedom through
publicly funded school choice enjoys no constitutional protection. Nor is
there a legitimate public purpose for segregative practices that arbitrarily
deprive children of their freedoms, confer benefits on a few and burden
the rest, and subvert the state constitutional duty to educate all children
democratically.
Opposition to separate but free extends beyond school choice,
potentially reaching other segregative state actions that curtail
educational freedoms.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. For their insightful
comments and noted scholarship, I thank Derek Black, Preston Green, Jon Hale, Martha Minow,
and Matthew Patrick Shaw. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Arthur B.
Hodges Research Grant.
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INTRODUCTION
When eleven Black teens were denied admission to a “spare-noexpense,” all-White DC middle school in 1950, they took their case all
the way to the Supreme Court.1 But they had a problem: They were
residents of DC, a federal district and not a state, so the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee did not protect them.2 Unable
to challenge “separate but equal” as inherently unequal, the teens relied
on the Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee,3 contending that
segregation deprived them of the freedom of an integrated education.4
“The basic question here is one of liberty,” their attorney concluded
in oral argument, “and under liberty, under the due process clause, you
1. ALISON STEWART, FIRST CLASS: THE LEGACY OF DUNBAR, AMERICA’S FIRST BLACK
PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL 162 (2013).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” (emphasis added)).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.” (emphasis added)).
4. STEWART, supra note 1, at 165.
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cannot deal with it as a quantum of treatment, substantially equal. You
either have liberty or you do not.”5 The Supreme Court agreed. In Bolling
v. Sharpe6—decided the same day as Brown v. Board of Education7—the
Court held that racial segregation in the DC public schools arbitrarily
deprived the Black teens “of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause.”8
Fast forward to the present: not a single White student attends that
same DC middle school, whose students all identify as racial minorities.9
The school’s demographics reflect the nadir of a post-Bolling,
distinctively American education story which has had a consistent,
overarching theme: separate but free. Exercising their parental freedom,
Whites fled to the DC suburbs or remained ensconced in affluent DC
neighborhoods. Many Black parents, feeling trapped in poor
neighborhoods and seeking an escape route for their kids, freely chose to
enroll them in charter schools.10
Almost half of DC students now attend charter schools that are “more
racially isolated” than the public schools; nearly a quarter of the charters
are “hypersegregated, enrolling 99–100% of non-white students.”11
Many of these charter schools were established for the purpose of
“serving minority students,” are located in “highly segregated
neighborhoods, to recruit and appeal to minority populations, and often
do not provide transportation for students living in other parts of the
district.”12 Most White families in DC suburbs and affluent DC
neighborhoods meanwhile continue to enjoy the luxury of not having to
make a choice, “remaining in their neighborhood[] schools and not
entering the charter sector.”13
Similar residential and school segregative patterns persist in other
urban areas, though in still other parts of the country the pattern takes a
decidedly different turn: “white charter school enclaves are forming.”14
Neither segregation is exclusive to charter schools. Vouchers—in all their
forms—have enabled parents, through their private school selections, to
5. Id. at 167.
6. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
9. See Clare Berke, Honoring #BollingAt65, LEARN TOGETHER LIVE TOGETHER (May 17,
2019), https://learnlivetogether.org/2019/05/17/honoring-bollingat65/ [https://perma.cc/4HDBMHT5].
10. See Sam Brill, The Law of School Catchment Areas, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 349,
371 (2019).
11. Id. at 392–93.
12. Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted).
13. Id. at 394.
14. Erika K. Wilson, The New White Flight, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 238
(2019).
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create and maintain “homogenous enclaves.”15 And it is not just
segregation by race or ethnicity; school choice has also sustained or
exacerbated segregation by class, language, and disability.16 It has
compounded17 the already-crushing reality that, on balance, schools are
as segregated now as they were in the 1960s, in some instances more
segregated.18
Myriad political, economic, and social dynamics provoked this
resegregation, but the law shares the blame. Federal constitutional law, in
particular, “substantially contributed to the resegregation.”19 Supreme
Court precedent has effectively encouraged courts to end, rather than
achieve, desegregation.20 It has eroded Brown’s holding to forbid only
intentional, state-imposed, racial segregation and limited the remedial
measures that courts can mandate to achieve desegregation.21 Adding
insult to injury, the Court also severely curbed voluntary desegregation,
viewing such plans that considered race to achieve integration somehow
discriminatory.22 While the Court deems those voluntary choices suspect,
it has revered the parental choices that have widened school funding
disparities rendering schools “separate and unequal”—a cruel irony
upending Brown.23
But what about Bolling? Chief Justice Earl Warren came close in
Bolling to recognizing education as “a fundamental liberty guaranteed
under the Due Process Clause,” omitting that language only to preserve a

15. Derek W. Black, Preferencing Educational Choice: The Constitutional Limits, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1359, 1390–91 (2018).
16. See id. at 1402; infra notes 300–89.
17. See Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School Choice as Racial Subordination,
99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1117 (2014).
18. See Erica Frankenberg et al., Our Common Future: America’s Segregated Schools 65
Years After Brown, UCLA CIV. RTS. PROJECT 7, 8 (May 10, 2019),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/23j1b9nv [https://perma.cc/WT47-VB7U].
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2003).
20. Id. at 1601.
21. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200, 208 (1973) (holding that de facto
segregation did not offend the Constitution and emphasizing that de jure segregation required a
“purpose or intent to segregate” (emphasis omitted)); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45
(1974) (holding that the remedy for de jure segregation could not reach beyond the school
district’s boundaries unless plaintiff could show schools outside those boundaries collaborated in
segregation).
22. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 783–87
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining the heavy burden that a state would have to carry in
devising a plan that considers race and satisfies strict scrutiny).
23. Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2003) (emphasis added).
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unanimous decision.24 And yet that decision now carries relatively little
weight. Bolling has been cast aside, unfairly derided as a politically
contrived decision such that few scholars, and fewer courts, give it any
serious attention.25 The exceptions have focused exclusively on Bolling’s
potential application of federal substantive due process,26 where the
prospects for its actual application appear dim.27
Until now, no scholar has applied Bolling’s liberty-based rationale to
state constitutional law. What follows is not an armchair thought
experiment, however. It is a case for invoking substantive due process
where it originated—in state courts—to oppose the prevailing dogma of
separate but free. Borrowing lines from Brown, that dogma has no place
in the field of public education: separate is inherently unfree.
This Article is the first to propose an affirmative legal theory of
education as freedom to make that very case. School choice, it turns out,
has not cornered the market on educational freedom. Indeed, the freedom
of separate but free peddled to parents is a bill of goods, supposedly
trading badges of inferiority wrought by segregation for badges of
superiority through school choice. But the freedom of school choice
functions as a negative right (“freedom from” something); is frequently
illusory; not exercised directly by children; and sustains or intensifies
segregation. The freedom proposed here functions as a positive right
(“freedom to be” someone); is socially cultivated; emancipates the youth,
who can exercise it throughout their lives; and demands integration.
This positive freedom was integral to the vision held by the framers
of education clauses in state constitutions—a vision that was developed
by early twentieth century progressives, percolated at various times in
court decisions, and put to practice during the Civil Rights Era by Black
teachers and children in “freedom schools” and “free schools.”28
Education as freedom, surveyed in Part I, takes two forms: First,
schoolchildren’s freedom to become full and equal citizens, which has
been an object of state education rights since their inception and enforced

24. Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education—A Critical Introduction, in WHAT
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 58 (Jack Balkin ed., 2001).
25. See David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia,
93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1253 (2005).
26. See Martha Minow, “A Proper Objective”: Constitutional Commitment and
Educational Opportunity After Bolling v. Sharpe and Parents Involved in Community Schools,
55 HOW. L.J. 575, 594–98 (2012) (“Using a due process framework could allow courts and
advocates to focus productively on the liberty of each student to pursue equal educational
opportunities with access to diverse student bodies.”). See generally Bernstein, supra note 25
(discussing scholars’ focus on the Court’s use of the Due Process Clause in Bolling).
27. See infra Section II.A.
28. See infra Sections I.A–B.
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as such primarily in school funding litigation.29 Courts have not named it
“freedom,” preferring “adequacy” instead, but it underwrites their
reasoning in any case. Second, schoolchildren’s freedom to learn in
democratic, integrated, and transformative settings likewise infuses the
text, history, and precedent of state education rights.30 States should, at
last, reclaim this freedom that is so critical to their constitutional duty to
educate democratically.
State courts can protect these educational freedoms through the
substantive due process guarantees, evaluated in Part II. Federal courts
cannot be counted on, as evidenced by their recent rejections of attempts
to ground a federal right to education in substantive due process—a
doctrine that undercuts democracy, according to an increasingly
dominant federal-bench ideology.31 Conversely, state judges have long
effectuated state substantive due process in ways that safeguard
democracy. Indeed, a century before the beginnings of the federal
doctrine, state courts had already made substantive due process part of
their canon.
Antebellum state courts enforced two such guarantees against (i)
arbitrary deprivations of vested rights and (ii) class legislation that
bestows special benefits or imposes unique burdens contrary to general
law principles.32 To be sure, these guarantees are now rarely enforced
because state courts hastily followed the federal courts’ lead. But they
remain good law. And state due process guarantees need not require proof
of discriminatory intent or limit exacting scrutiny to certain suspect
classes—i.e., they need not comport with the strictures of the federal
doctrine. State courts can thus retake the lead, revitalizing substantive due
process guarantees to protect educational freedoms.
Scrutinizing segregative school choice practices, as shown in Part III,
presents a straightforward application of due process to those freedoms.
Prior facial challenges to school choice have failed because they have
“claimed too much, seeking to absolutely block charters and vouchers.”33
Litigants have had more success with as applied challenges, targeting
specific practices and disparities. Still, courts are likely to remain highly
deferential to choice programs in the face of conflicting evidence unless
their means cannot reasonably relate to, or achieve, legitimate ends.34
That is, unless the state action is arbitrary and deprives schoolchildren of

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B.
Black, supra note 15, at 1403.
See infra note 316.
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a vested liberty interest. Such is the case with segregative choice practices
that are incompatible with educational freedom.35
Alternatively, segregative choice practices are the product of class
legislation lacking sufficient antidiscrimination protections. As such,
these laws permit choice practices to single out schoolchildren by race,
class, and disability for benefits and burdens. Although all laws to some
degree single out subjects for regulation, segregative choice practices do
so impermissibly when judged from a baseline of educational freedom.
Choice practices that deviate from the baseline, exceeding or maintaining
the degree of segregation in comparator public schools, arbitrarily
deprive children in public schools and schools of choice of the freedom
to become equal citizens and to learn in democratic, integrated, and
transformative settings. In that case, the remedy for segregative school
choice practices is integrative school choice practices.36
This Article is timely. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed and
exacerbated educational deprivations and disparities that will have
lasting, far-reaching ramifications. There are those who would exploit the
anxieties and frustrations of this most uncertain time to pin all of society’s
ills on public schools. It is no coincidence that a wave of legislation
expanding school choice programs has passed or is under consideration.37
It is no hyperbole to say this could mark the beginning of the end of public
education as we know it. But it is not too late to reclaim and recommit
ourselves to the foundational principles of public schooling, equality, and
freedom.
I. RECLAIMING EDUCATION AS FREEDOM
“Freedom is like love—you share it without loss, and you realize its
fullness only when you share it equally with someone else.”38
For as long as we have yearned for freedom, we have disagreed about
what it means to be free. In philosophy, religion, law, and even science,
freedom remains an “essentially contested concept.”39 No less so in
35. See infra Section III.A.
36. See infra Section III.B.
37. See Valerie Strauss, The Movement to Privatize Public Schools Marches on During
Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 20, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/educ
ation/2021/05/20/school-privatization-movement-marches-on-during-pandemic/ [https://perma
.cc/5NFD-ZHWT].
38. Guy B. Johnson, Freedom, Equality, and Segregation, 20 REV. POL. 147, 147 (1958)
(emphasis omitted).
39. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169
(1956) (“[T]here are concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which
inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”); ERIC
FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, at xiv (1999) (characterizing freedom as an
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education.40 There, as elsewhere, the recurring controversy is whether
freedom should be understood negatively, as just the “absence of
something (i.e., of obstacles, barriers, constraints, or interference from
others),” or also positively, as “the presence of something (i.e., of
control, self-mastery, self-determination, or self-realization).”41
Arguments on either side fill volumes of collected works, but they
need not occupy much space here. As construed by the highest state
courts, education clauses in state constitutions settle the debate for our
purposes by firmly endorsing positive freedom.
Education clauses have long been recognized as repositories of
affirmative or positive rights to education.42 Rights are said to be positive
essentially contested concept); see also, e.g., Tim O’Keefe, Ancient Theories of Freedom and
Determinism, STAN. ENCY. PHIL. (2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/
freedom-ancient [https://perma.cc/M4LG-W6UD] (describing disagreements between
philosophers about the fundamental nature of freedom); TISA WENGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 2 (2017) (describing the idiosyncratic and
contradictory ways that the concept of American religious freedom has been perceived and
affected perception); MICHAEL ABRAHAM, THE SCIENCE OF FREEDOM (Avi Woolf trans., 2018)
(contemplating whether one must choose between science and free will).
40. See MAX A. HOPE, RECLAIMING FREEDOM IN EDUCATION: THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF
RADICAL FREE SCHOOL EDUCATION 1 (2018) (observing, in the context of education, that
“[f]reedom is a complex and contested topic”); EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY (Harold
B. Alberty & Boyd H. Bode, eds., 1938).
41. Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative
[https://perma.cc/2R99-ZBCS].
Virtually all agree that freedom should be at least construed negatively. Id. Scholars have
contested this distinction between positive and negative freedom, among them Gerald
MacCallum, who proposed that there is only one concept of liberty that involves a Triadic relation:
[T]hat is, a relation between three things: an agent, certain preventing conditions,
and certain doings or becomings of the agent. Any statement about freedom or
unfreedom can be translated into a statement of the above form by specifying
what is free or unfree, from what it is free or unfree, and what it is free or unfree
to do or become.
Id. Although MacCallum’s critique has been influential, the positive versus negative “distinction
remains an important point of reference for discussions about the meaning and value of political
and social freedom.” Id.
42. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (reaffirming that state
constitution “confers on children . . . a positive constitutional right to an amply funded
education”); Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 370–71, 374 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (“[S]tate
constitutions contain the textual basis for affirmative rights.”); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267,
1282–83 (Conn. 1996) (recognizing “schoolchildren’s fundamental affirmative right [to
education]”); see also Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (stating that every state
constitution “provides the basis for a variety of positive claims against the government,” including
“the right of children to receive free public schooling”); Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893–95 (1989) (listing
education as one of the positive rights often included in state constitutions).
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when they entitle the rightsholder to the “provision of some good or
service” whereas rights are said to be negative when they entitle the
rightsholder to “non-interference.”43 Because this positive-versusnegative-rights distinction largely tracks the positive-versus-negativefreedom distinction, the two are often conflated44 even though they are
conceptually different.45 Perhaps the best way to understand the
difference is to appreciate that positive rights are both necessary and
sufficient to protect positive freedoms, whereas negative rights are only
necessary, not sufficient.46
As explained below, state courts construing education clauses have
justified positive rights to education as being both necessary and
sufficient conditions for certain positive freedoms. The question then is
not whether education as freedom should be construed positively (as it
has been), but which positive educational freedoms enjoy constitutional
protection?
For sure, the freedom to become full and equal citizens follows most
obviously and logically from the text and precedent of education clauses,
even if the courts have yet to name it. This freedom’s evolutionary period
is possibly too long for it to be valued as such, but a positive freedom it
is, nonetheless. There is another, ever-present freedom with no latency,
however, that yet remains dormant and unappreciated due to our
collective failure to claim it, or more accurately, reclaim it: the freedom
to learn in democratic, integrated, and transformative settings.
43. Leif
Wenar,
Rights,
STAN.
ENCYC.
PHIL.
(Feb.
24,
2020),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ [https://perma.cc/7DLH-SZZ8]. As with the positiveversus-negative-freedom distinction, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, the positiveversus-negative-rights distinction is the subject of considerable debate about whether it has
outlived its usefulness. Id.
44. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional
Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 508–10 (2004) (describing “positive right” as the “legal corollary”
of “positive freedom”).
45. See Frank I. Michelman, Anti-Negativity as Form, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 83, 84
(1996) (“As political and legal theory currently apply them to conceptions of liberty and to
conceptions of rights, the oppositions of negative/positive (liberty), and of negative/affirmative
(rights) certainly do mark clear and well-understood differences.”).
46. Cf. id. at 85 (“As against the state (1) negative basic rights of autonomy, association,
and communication, no less than affirmative basic health care and education rights, may be
practically prerequisite to the good of positive liberty.”); see also Richard Dagger, Freedom and
Rights, in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 203–05 (Andrew Dobson &
Robyn Eckersley eds., 2006); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116
YALE L.J. 330, 336 (2006) (“[T]he social citizenship tradition assigns equal constitutional status
to negative rights against government oppression and positive rights to government assistance on
the ground that both are essential to liberty.”); Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal
Opportunity: A Jurisprudential Appraisal, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1694 (1986) (“[A]n
individual’s positive freedom to pursue a goal, may depend on her having a positive right to a
particular good, the possession of which is a prerequisite for the very possibility of obtaining that
goal.”).

1148

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

A. The Freedom to Become
Two of the three freedoms that the Supreme Court has recognized visà-vis public education are inimical to public schooling, and all three are
negative. The first to be recognized is not one that children can even
exercise; rather, parents retain the privilege to remove their children from
public school and enroll them in private school or homeschool them.47
More generally, parents also enjoy “the privilege ‘to control the education
of their own,’ including directing the religious education of their
children.”48 This is a negative freedom from state interference that does
not much advance (and arguably detracts from) the public mission of
public education.
The second negative freedom consists of a set of First Amendment
privileges and immunities held by schoolchildren, recognized in cases
like West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette49 and Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Board.50 “Barnette concerns
which varieties of speech schools may not compel, and Tinker concerns
which varieties of speech schools must permit.”51 There is a similar
dynamic for religious freedom, which prohibits its establishment52 but
otherwise guarantees its free exercise in school settings.53
The third negative freedom, more inimical to public education than
the first, was pronounced by a 5–4 Court in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,54 which refused to recognize a federal right
to education under the Equal Protection Clause.55 The majority rejected
any asserted right to equal or more equitable education funding in poor
districts partly to maintain “local control” of education such that wealthy
districts could enjoy “the freedom to devote more money to the education
of one’s children.”56
State courts construing education clauses have converted the Supreme
Court’s expressions of negative freedom into enforceable positive
freedoms. That conversion came by way of a rebuke to Rodriguez.
In recognition of state constitutional rights to education, several state
courts first expected equal school funding, and instead came to embrace

47. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
48. Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 930
(2016) (footnote omitted) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923)).
49. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
50. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
51. Aaron Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FIU L. REV. 765, 782 (2019).
52. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
53. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963).
54. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
55. See id. at 35.
56. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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the fairness of equitable funding.57 Eventually, a majority of state courts
also insisted on adequate funding—that is, enough to provide all children
access to educational standards and outcomes mandated by their state
constitutions.58 Education clauses in particular—employing adjectives
such as “suitable,” “uniform,” “thorough,” or “efficient,” or some
combination thereof—denote a certain quality of education as necessary
to be constitutionally adequate.59 Effectuating these clauses gave birth to
the positive freedom to become: “when tasked to justify adequacy as the
qualitative standard that the state has to meet to discharge its duty, courts
repeatedly [endorsed] the notion that education fortifies children’s
positive liberties.”60
This notion is unmistakable in certain state constitutions which
explicitly acknowledge education as “essential to the preservation of the
rights and liberties of the people.”61 It is an inescapable inference in other
explicit provisions, recognizing the essentiality of education to a “free,”
“good,” or “republican form,” of government “by the people.”62 The
inference is also unavoidable from the history, structure, and implication
of education clauses, even absent such explicit terms. In that vein, the
New Jersey Supreme Court put it succinctly: “[The education clause’s]
purpose was to impose on the legislature a duty of providing for a
thorough and efficient system of free schools, capable of affording to
every child such instruction as is necessary to fit it for the ordinary duties
of citizenship.”63
That education is indispensable to preparing, enabling, or cultivating
children to become “capable,” “equipped,” have the “capacity,” to
“participate” or “function” as citizens and productive members of society
appears in virtually all significant state high court decisions interpreting

57. See Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215,
225–40 (2017).
58. Id.
59. See Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State
Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 281,
291 (noting considerable variation in the language of education clauses but observing that “courts
have held that whenever a state is required to establish and maintain a public education system,
regardless of the particular language used to describe it, it must meet basic quality standards”).
60. Weishart, supra note 58, at 235.
61. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a);
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
62. See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15.
63. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 173 (N.J. 1976) (citing Landis v. Ashworth, 31 A.
1017, 1018 (N.J. 1895)).
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state education clauses, often coextensive with state equality
guarantees.64
64. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 627 (S.D. 2011) (“The constitutional
language and intent of the framers guarantee the children of South Dakota a constitutional right
to an education that provides them with the opportunity to prepare for their future roles as citizens,
participants in the political system, and competitors both economically and intellectually.”
(emphasis omitted)); Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 253
(Conn. 2010) (“[W]e conclude that article eighth, § 1, entitles Connecticut public school students
to an education suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible citizens able to participate
fully in democratic institutions . . . .”); Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 415 (Wis. 2000) (“An
equal opportunity for a sound basic education is one that will equip students for their roles as
citizens and enable them to succeed economically and personally.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1358–59 (N.H. 1997) (“[E]ven a minimalist view of educational
adequacy recognizes the role of education in preparing citizens to participate in the exercise of
voting and first amendment rights.”); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ohio 1997)
(“[W]hen our forefathers convened to write our state Constitution, they carried within them a
deep-seated belief that liberty and individual opportunity could be preserved only by educating
Ohio’s citizens.”); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 393 (Vt. 1997) (“[The Education Clause]
expressed and incorporated ‘that part of republican theory which holds education essential to selfgovernment and which recognizes government as the source of the perpetuation of the attributes
of citizenship.’” (quoting Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to
Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 97–98 (1989))); Campbell Cnty.
Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1259 (Wyo. 1995) (“[W]e can conclude the framers intended
the education article as a mandate to the state legislature to provide an education system of a
character which provides Wyoming students with a uniform opportunity to become equipped for
their future roles as citizens, participants in the political system, and competitors both
economically and intellectually.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666
(N.Y. 1995) (“[E]ducation should consist of the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills
necessary to enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of
voting and serving on a jury.”); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806,
812 (Ariz. 1994) (noting drafters of education clause believed “a free society could not exist
without educated participants”); Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170, 1195 (Kan.
1994) (“Education is the greatest vehicle available to the state to prepare our children to be the
neighbors, parents, leaders, workers, taxpayers, citizens, voters, and patriots of tomorrow.”);
McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 1993) (recognizing
education is “fundamentally” designed “to prepare [children] to participate as free citizens of a
free State to meet the needs and interests of a republican government”); Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 310 (Minn. 1993) (noting “object” of education provisions was to ensure all children
“may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties
as citizens of the republic” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412, 416 (1871))); Abbott
v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) (“A thorough and efficient education requires such level
of education as will enable all students to function as citizens and workers in the same
society . . . .”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989) (listing
the seven end products of an “efficient” system of education, including a “sufficient knowledge
of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices”);
DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (“Education becomes the
essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively realize
their established rights.”); Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982)
(“We recognize unequivocally that public education plays a vital role in our free society. It can
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The precise language varies but the idea is the same: Education
empowers children with positive freedoms. It does not merely create
opportunities to become full and equal citizens, it equips children with
the capabilities to function as such. That is the hallmark of a positive
sense of freedom, the presence of something—in this case, capabilities—
that enables or enhances self-determination and self-realization.65
Several state courts have taken it upon themselves to articulate the
capabilities or capacities that a constitutionally adequate education
should cultivate.66 Granted, they have not described those capacities or
capabilities as freedoms. “In truth, courts did not need to risk invoking
‘any fancy philosophical or newfangled positive liberty,’”67 which might
thrust them “beyond the reassuringly familiar terrain of negative rights,”
because it was already politically expedient to favor adequacy as
“synonymous . . . with educational quality.”68

be a major factor in an individual’s chances for economic and social success as well as a unique
influence on a child’s development as a good citizen and on his future participation in political
and community life.” (citing cases)); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981) (“[I]t
is clear that even a ‘minimum’ education ‘must provide each child with an opportunity to acquire
the basic minimum skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 37 (1973))); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 897 (N.D. 1980) (“The State of North
Dakota has a recognized and conceded interest in assuring the sufficient education of the children
of the residents of the state to enable them to be viable citizens in the community.” (emphasis
omitted)); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (defining a “thorough and
efficient” education as one which “develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the
minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations,
recreation and citizenship, and does so economically”); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d
71, 94 (Wash. 1978) (“[T]he State’s constitutional duty . . . embraces broad educational
opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens
and as potential competitors in today’s market as well as in the market place of ideas.”); Serrano
v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1256 (Cal. 1971) (“[E]ducation is a unique influence on a child’s
development as a citizen and his participation in political and community life.”); McNair v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 288 P. 188, 190 (Mont. 1930) (“[I]t is clear that the solemn mandate of the
Constitution is not discharged by the mere training of the mind; mentality without physical wellbeing does not make for good citizenship–the good citizen, the man or woman who is of the
greatest value to the state, is the one whose every faculty is developed and alert.”).
65. See supra text accompanying note 41.
66. Among the most frequently cited are the seven capacities articulated by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Rose v. Council for Better Education Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989),
which other state courts have adopted. See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236 (Kan. 2014)
(per curiam); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353,
1359 (N.H. 1997); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). Still other state courts have
articulated their own list of capabilities. See, e.g., Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d
535, 540 (S.C. 1999); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
67. Weishart, supra note 58, at 235 (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Community and Property—
For Those Who Have Neither, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161, 180 (2009)).
68. Id. at 234–35.
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It cannot be credibly disputed, however, that children’s positive
freedoms underwrite those qualitative standards. Why else would we be
concerned about educational quality? Instrumentally valued, a child’s
education is for naught if it does not enhance her positive freedoms.
Intrinsically valued, a freedom-enhancing education is surely to be
preferred over a freedom-neutralizing one.
But there is another explanation for why courts failed to perceive, or
properly name, what was the logical end of their reasoning: The freedom
to become is an evolving freedom with at least an eighteen-year
evolutionary period.69 It is easy to overlook or disregard what cannot be
exercised at once. States have, after all, justified their parens patriae
authority over children in numerous policies, including compulsory
school attendance laws, based on the view that children are not fully
autonomous agents.70
But a burgeoning freedom warrants no less constitutional protection—
if it is to become a fully fledged one. That is the import of the negative
freedom first recognized in Barnette, prohibiting schools from
compelling certain speech because “they are educating the young for
citizenship.”71 For that reason, the Court said children’s “Constitutional
freedoms,” though evolving, deserved “scrupulous protection” lest
compelled speech “strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.”72
In Justice Robert H. Jackson’s characteristic eloquence, the Court then
alluded to the expectation that this negative freedom would be tested in a
more economically and socially integrated society:
These principles grew in soil which also produced a
philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that
his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints . . . . We must transplant these rights
to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of
non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs,
and social advancements are increasingly sought through
closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls.73
69. See Madoka Saito, Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to Education: A Critical
Exploration, 37 J. PHIL. EDUC. 17, 25 (2003).
70. See Weishart, supra note 48, at 928 (citing Anne C. Dailey, Children’s Constitutional
Rights, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2099, 2106–12 (2011)).
71. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 639–40; see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting:
Kalman's “Strange Career” and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025,
1069 (1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996))
(characterizing Justice Jackson’s eloquence as “rejecting the classical liberal vision of limited
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Rather than withering away, however, this negative freedom has
coevolved alongside a blossoming positive freedom. That freedom has
been nourished in the rich soil of state education clauses where one finds
a constitutional duty to educate democratically—to democratize
schoolchildren to meet the demands of citizenship.74
The Supreme Court laid part of the groundwork for that duty in
Brown, recognizing “the importance of education to our democratic
society [as] the very foundation of good citizenship.”75 The Court later
reiterated that “education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence.”76 Time and again, the Court has
emphasized this obligation—that “public education must prepare pupils
for citizenship in the Republic. . . . It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves . . . as indispensable to the
practice of self-government in the community and the nation.”77
State courts are in accord: “[A]ll of the highest state courts to have
considered the matter—‘100 percent of the courts’—have recognized that
the ‘primary purpose or a primary purpose’ of public education is to
democratize schoolchildren, to prepare them for ‘capable citizenship.’”78
These courts have likewise recognized that this primary purpose of public
education can only be effectuated by imposing a duty on the state to
educate democratically.79
government and an unregulated market, and in embracing a more complex vision, in which
individual rights paradoxically depend upon strong government and social integration” (emphasis
omitted)).
74. See Joshua E. Weishart, Democratizing Education Rights, 29 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1, 42–43 (2020) (explaining that duty to educate democratically animates from text, history,
and precedents of state constitution education clauses).
75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
76. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
77. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (alteration in original)
(quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(William Beard ed., 1968)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“We have
‘recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
system of government.’” (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring))).
78. Weishart, supra note 74, at 50 (quoting MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY:
SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 57 (2018)).
79. See, e.g., Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1259 (Wyo. 1995) (“[W]e
can conclude the framers intended the education article as a mandate to the state legislature to
provide an education system of a character which provides Wyoming students with a uniform
opportunity to become equipped for their future roles as citizens, participants in the political
system, and competitors both economically and intellectually.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v.
Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1380 (N.H. 1993) (“[T]he framers and general populace [understood]
the language contained in [the education clause] to impose a duty on the State to support the public
schools and ensure an educated citizenry . . . .”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Off. of Educ., 615
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That duty cannot be discharged by noninterference; it requires
government’s direct intervention. The government is thereby licensed,
not to indoctrinate, but to liberate schoolchildren by developing their
positive freedoms.80
At bottom, education-clause precedent contrasts Rodriguez’s negative
“freedom to devote more money to the education of one’s children” with
a state duty to devote more money to the education of all children, to
enhance their positive freedoms.81 Likewise, Barnette’s negative freedom
from school interference can be juxtaposed with the education clause
precedent of a positive freedom for school intervention, both respecting
democratic education. Those contrasts provide a sharper focus of a stateendorsed positive freedom to become full, effective, and equal citizens.
B. The Freedom to Learn
Four score and six years before Brown, the Iowa Supreme Court
became the first high court in the nation to outlaw school segregation.82
Grammar School No. 2 in Muscatine, Iowa denied admission to Susan
Clark, a twelve-year-old Black girl, on the grounds that “public sentiment
[was] opposed to the intermingling of white and colored children in the
same schools, and the best interests of both races require them to be
educated in separate schools.”83 The court squarely rejected those
grounds as unlawful.84 Hailed as an early and courageous victory for
racial equality,85 the decision was also a prelude to a democratic,
integrated, transformative freedom to learn.
1. Democratic
The “principle of equal rights to all” was the stated basis for the Clark
decision.86 But the Iowa constitution’s equality provision was just one of
N.E.2d 516, 524 (Mass. 1993) (“The immediate purpose of the establishment of the duty . . . [and
its] ultimate end is the preservation of rights and liberties.”).
80. Cf. THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 276 (John P. Foley ed., 1900) (“[O]f all the views of this law [for public
education] none is more important, none more legitimate, than that of rendering the people the
safe, as they are the ultimate guardians of their own liberty.”); Gert Biesta & Carl Anders
Säfström, A Manifesto for Education, 9 POL’Y FUTURES EDUC. 540, 540 (2011) (“[E]ducational
freedom is not about the absence of authority but about authority that carries an orientation
towards freedom with it.”).
81. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973) (emphasis added).
82. See Clark v. Bd. of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868).
83. Id. at 268.
84. See id. at 276.
85. See Russell E. Lovell, II, Shine on, You Bright Radical Star: Clark v. Board of School
Directors (of Muscatine)-the Iowa Supreme Court’s Civil Rights Exceptionalism, 67 DRAKE L.
REV. 175, 177 (2019).
86. Clark, 24 Iowa at 269.

2021]

SEPARATE BUT FREE

1155

two sources for the court’s reasoning. The other, an education clause,
provided for “the education of all the youths of the State, through a
system of common schools.”87 The court explained that permitting
segregation would not only do violence to the principle of equality, it
would also sabotage the mission of common schools: “[The] policy of the
government to organize into one harmonious people, with a common
country and stimulated with the common purpose to perpetuate and
spread our free institutions for the development, elevation and happiness
of mankind.”88
Segregation thus subverted the “sovereign will” of Iowans who had
ratified the common schools mission in the education clause.89
Significantly, segregation also deprived children of the “right” or
“privileges and benefits of our common schools.”90 The notion that
children had a right or privilege to common schooling was not new.
Common schools architect Horace Mann advocated for this “absolute
right . . . to an education”91 and the corresponding “correlative duty of
every government to see that the means of that education are provided for
all.”92 Mann, in fact, headed a commission appointed by the Iowa General
Assembly just prior to the adoption of two education clauses.93 The
commission “declared that every youth was entitled to an education . . .
[through the] provision of common schools.”94
By the time of the Clark decision in 1868, the common schools
movement had swept most of the nation, overcoming stiff opposition.95
The victors, common schools proponents, led the drafting of education
clauses in state constitutions.96 “By 1868, thirty-six out of thirty-seven
states, or ninety-seven percent, included constitutional provisions
obligating state governments to provide public education to all

87. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 276.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Edward Mansfield, Clark and Citizenship, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 247, 249
(2019) (“Citizenship means we go to school together.”).
91. HORACE MANN, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. BOARD OF EDUC., TENTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, H. No. 1, at 112 (1847) (emphasis omitted).
92. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 77
(1951) (quoting MANN, supra note 91, at 112).
93. See King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 55–56 (Iowa 2012) (Appel, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 55.
95. See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876–1957, at 13 (1968); MICHAEL A. REBELL, FLUNKING DEMOCRACY:
SCHOOLS, COURTS, AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 52 (2018) (“Next to abolition, the battle to establish
common schools constituted the most contentious political issue of the nineteenth century.”).
96. See REBELL, supra note 95, at 55; CREMIN, supra note 92, at 138; Allen W. Hubsch,
Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L.
& EDUC. 93, 96–97 (1989).
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students.”97 Indeed, following the Civil War, several state constitutions
in the newly readmitted states mandated “that public schools be open to
all—a direct repudiation of the idea that schools would be segregated.”98
Universal education was not the sole objective.99 The common school
movement was largely successful because of another objective: the
democratization of schoolchildren.100 The people began to see the public
school as a “democratizing institution,” “entrusted with a responsibility
on which depended the perpetuation and progress of the society.”101 This
responsibility for common schools was reiterated in several state
constitutional conventions.102
“The meaning of the term ‘common school’ was so clear” during some
of these conventions that “its definition hardly merited serious
discussion.”103 That is because its “meaning had been etched in the public
mind” by common schools proponents who used the term “to refer
specifically to a non-sectarian, publicly funded school where children of
all classes and backgrounds would be educated together.”104
It would be common, not as a school for the common
people . . . but rather as a school common to all people. It
would be open to all and supported by tax funds. It would be
for rich and poor alike, the equal of any private institution.
And, by receiving children of all creeds, classes and
backgrounds, . . . it would kindle a spirit of amity and mutual
respect that the conflicts of adult life could never destroy.105
97. Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 92, 124 (2013).
98. Derek W. Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1059,
1092 & nn.242–43 (2019) (footnote omitted).
99. Friedman & Solow, supra note 97, at 123–24 (describing goals of common schools
movement); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools, 48
B.C. L. REV. 909, 933–34 (2007) (same).
100. See Weishart, supra note 74, at 50–52.
101. CREMIN, supra note 92, at 48.
102. See, e.g., Molly O’Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School, 51
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 598–99 (2004); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration
Through Public School Choice: A Progressive Alternative to Vouchers, 45 HOW. L.J. 247, 276
(2002). But see Saiger, supra note 99, at 932–33 (“‘Common schooling,’ however, named a
multifaceted political program and described a set of complex institutions . . . . [Thus,] it is
difficult to know which aspects of the common school concept various framers meant to
constitutionalize . . . .” (quoting O’Brien & Woodrum, supra, at 587)).
103. O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 102, at 587.
104. Id. at 587–88 (emphasis added).
105. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783–
1876, at 138 (1980); see also JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL: FROM THE PURITANS TO NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND 79 (7th ed. 2008) (noting that the impetus behind the common school
movement was to provide “children from a variety of religious, social-class, and ethnic
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Common schooling thus “signified a school experience common to all
children.”106 That shared experience, proponents believed, would
“forge a social bond by providing common moral and political
understandings to otherwise different individuals and groups.”107 This
“common core of values” would, in turn, help form a “political
community” built on “mutual understanding.”108 Common schooling
would thus “tamp down the effects of the diversity of origins and of
families, counteract the potential for tribalism, and create a unifying
influence.”109 The common school was, in short, necessary for the
common good.110
The cruel irony is that some, though not all, common school
proponents consciously excluded or failed to consider certain children—
for example, African Americans, women, the disabled—in their vision of
commonality.111 And the ugly truth is that the common schools
backgrounds” with a common education such that “there would be a decline in hostility and
friction among social groups”); DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION, 1785–1954, at 195, 199–200 (1987) (discussing early protest movements which
“shared an integrationist dream of equal access to public schools as one of the mainstream
institutions of American civic, economic, and social life”).
106. IRA KATZNELSON & MARGARET WEIR, SCHOOLING FOR ALL: CLASS, RACE, AND THE
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 208 (1985); see State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents & Tchrs.
v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1157 (Ohio 2006) (“The common-school movement . . .
held the basic ideology that all citizens should have ‘a common foundation of literacy, morality,
and patriotism, regardless of their origins . . . .’” (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. art. VI, § 2 ed.
cmt. (West 2004))).
107. DAVID C. PARIS, IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM: THEMES AND THEORIES IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION 62 (1995); see DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER: A
HISTORY OF COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 89 (1990); Mark G. Yudof, Equal Educational
Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 458 (1973) (“Mann . . . envisioned the common
school . . . as the instrument for creating a new sense of community and a new common value
system shared by all Americans in which diversity might flourish.”).
108. Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 174 (1996); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil
Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 422 (2000) (“Publicly supported common schools were seen as the best
way of promoting popular enlightenment and ties of mutual understanding and cooperation across
the bounds of class, ethnicity, and religion.”).
109. Saiger, supra note 51, at 791; see also David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods:
The American Struggle over Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RSCH. J. 39, 45 (1997) (noting
common school founders believed this would provide “a common culture and a sense of shared
membership in the community”).
110. See O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 102, at 601.
111. See Molly Townes O’Brien, Brown on the Ground: A Journey of Faith in Schooling,
35 U. TOL. L. REV. 813, 825 (2004); TYACK ET AL., supra note 105, at 195, 200, 202; Roberts v.
City of Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849) (arguably first separate-but-equal decision, upholding
racially segregated schools to the extent they are equal notwithstanding the right to common
schooling); This made the Iowa Supreme Court decision in Clark all the more commendable. See
Lovell, supra note 85, at 184.
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movement was partly driven by bigoted, anti-Catholic tropes and divisive
“nativist sentiments.”112 That worldview was tragically wrong, even for
the time, and, of course, hypocritical. But, in their purest, unvarnishedby-flawed-humans form, the ideals of the common schools movement
were “egalitarian and progressive.”113 The “imperative to inculcate in
children a shared set of values needed to foster social harmony—
including tolerance, openness to social diversity, equality of concern,
mutual understanding and respect, and civility—those virtues”114 have
gone by many names, though seldom by “freedom.”
And yet, early defenders viewed common schools as “safeguards of
human freedom.”115 Their reasoning suggests an understanding of
freedom to learn in the democratic sense: inclusive, open to all,
participatory, and for the common good.116
2. Integrated
This notion of common schooling open to all and serving the common
good was espoused by state constitution convention delegates who
viewed such a democratic education as essential to maintaining a
republican form of government.117 Our commitment to that ideal was
immediately put to the test following the Civil War.118 And we failed.
112. See Friedman & Solow, supra note 97, at 122; see Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379,
413 (1854) (justifying common schooling “open to the children of the rich and the poor” as
necessary for “assimilation” and upholding expulsion of Roman Catholic student objecting to
literacy instruction making use of Protestant King James Bible).
113. Friedman & Solow, supra note 97, at 123.
114. See Sacha M. Coupet, Valuing All Identities Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate: The Case
for Inclusivity as a Civic Virtue in K-12, 27 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 16 n.49 (2020).
115. 11 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1850, at 1892 (1850) (“Sir, if there is any cause
that should call to its aid the universal sympathies and unflinching support of this people, it is the
cause of common schools. We should cherish it as one of the strongest safeguards of human
freedom . . . .”); see also Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 508, 516
(1845) (concluding laws requiring support for public schools for general education were
mandatory partially because “the encouragement of learning . . . tends to the promotion of religion
and good morals, and the security of civil and religious liberty”); Paynter v. State, 797 N.E.2d
1225, 1241 (N.Y. 2003) (quoting New York Governor DeWitt Clinton’s Address to the
Legislature in 1826: “I consider the system of our common schools as the palladium of
our freedom . . . .”).
116. See Bd. of Pub. Educ. of First Sch. Dist. v. Ransley, 58 A. 122, 123 (Pa. 1904) (“What
was first a constitutional requirement, that the Legislature should establish schools for the
education of the poor ‘gratis,’ in time became a universal demand for free education for all classes,
and for years, to thousands of the children of the rich as well as the poor . . . .”); State ex rel. Weiss
v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 8, 44 N.W. 967, 981 (Wis. 1890) (“[T]he common schools are free
to all alike, to all nationalities, to all sects of religion, to all ranks of society, and to all
complexions.”).
117. Black, supra note 98, at 1067, 1083–84, 1090–94.
118. See id. at 1094–95, 1099–1100.
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The children of former slaves, while freed from their physical bondage,
remained oppressed by segregated schooling—a social bondage that
inhibited the freedom of all children, White and Black alike, to learn.119
Among the earliest expressions of a socially integrated freedom to
learn was one penned by the “Great Dissenter” of Plessy v. Ferguson,120
Justice John Marshall Harlan, in a noted dissent to school segregation in
Berea College v. Kentucky.121 The majority in Berea College concluded
that the state could enforce segregation even in a private, racially
integrated college without offending the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.122 For Justice Harlan, who believed that the
Amendment’s citizenship guarantee meant “membership in a ‘political
community’” which “promised freedom,”123 the decision was inapposite:
[I]n the eye of the law the right to enjoy one’s religious
belief, unmolested by any human power, is no more sacred
nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is the right to
impart and receive instruction not harmful to the public. The
denial of either right would be an infringement of the liberty
inherent in the freedom secured by the fundamental law.124
Justice Harlan’s discernment of learning as a freedom was shared by
his contemporary—John Dewey, the most renowned progressive

119. See David Tyack & Robert Lowe, The Constitutional Moment: Reconstruction and
Black Education in the South, 94 AM. J. EDUC. 236, 239, 247 (1986). For a full accounting of the
notion of common schooling open to all as a “necessary component of freedom and citizenship,
which the government sought to guarantee in the immediate aftermath of slavery,” see Derek W.
Black, Freedom, Democracy, and the Right to Education, 116 N.W. L. REV. 1, 7, 9–23
(forthcoming 2022).
120. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
121. See 211 U.S. 45, 68 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting), abrogated by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
122. Id. at 57–58 (majority opinion).
123. See Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1383, 1390 (2008)
(quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 46 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
124. Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Despite his
vigorous, principled dissent, Justice Harlan observed that the case presented “no reference to
regulations prescribed for public schools, established at the pleasure of the State and maintained
at the public expense.” Id. at 69. Moreover, it should be noted that Justice Harlan “authored the
Court’s opinion three years later in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, upholding
a Georgia school district’s refusal to provide a high school for black children even as it provided
one for white children.” Liu, supra note 123, at 1385–86 (citing other opinions that “besmirched
his Plessy dissent”). As Matthew Patrick Shaw helpfully explained to me, we could understand
the juxtaposition between Berea and Cumming by “leaning heavily into the Lochnerian roots of
Justice Harlan’s ‘freedom’ jurisprudence. One could say that in Cumming Harlan declined to
obligate the state (or county) to action where in Berea he objected to the state interfering with a
private institution’s freedom to teach and student’s individual choices to learn what that institution
offered to teach.” For a more thorough exposition of Cumming, see Matthew Patrick Shaw, The
Public Right to Education, 89 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
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educator and American philosopher of his time.125 Dewey regarded
freedom in its fullest sense as positive, social, and emancipatory.126 “The
freedom of an agent who is merely released from direct external
obstructions,” that is, who merely exercises negative freedom, “is formal
and empty.”127 That such a hollow notion should exhaust our
understanding of freedom“—irrespective of differences in education, in
command of capital, and the control of the social environment which is
furnished by the institution of property—is a pure absurdity.”128
Freedom owes no allegiance to such isolated individualism, the notion
of the individual “as something given, complete in itself, and of liberty
as a ready-made possession of the individual, only needing the removal
of external restrictions in order to manifest itself.”129 On the contrary,
because the human condition is socially contingent, the practice of
freedom can “take place only in rich and manifold association with
others.”130 That entails “mutual adaptation, communication, cooperation,
and a coordination of interests and actions.”131 The exercise of freedom
is thus an “act of political living where we never lose sight of society and
the individual in their coextensive interdependence.”132
Because freedom is relational, it should also be emancipatory:
“Liberty in the concrete signifies release from the impact of particular
oppressive forces; emancipation from something once taken as a normal
part of human life but now experienced as bondage.”133 Thus, consistent
125. See generally JOHN BALDACCHINO, JOHN DEWEY: LIBERTY AND THE PEDAGOGY OF
DISPOSITION (Paul Gibbs ed., 2014) (discussing John Dewey’s work as a claim to people’s
potential found in experience, imagination, and a disposition toward liberty); ROBERT B.
WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991) (examining John Dewey’s
experimentation with progressive education and focus on the nation’s schools).
126. See BALDACCHINO, supra note 125, at 18; WESTBROOK, supra note 125, at 165, 188;
Matthew Festenstein, Dewey’s Political Philosophy, STAN. ENCYCL. PHIL. ARCHIVE 2, 6
(Winter 2019 ed. 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/dewey-political/
[https://perma.cc/3JM9-VBPA].
127. JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 438 (1909).
128. JOHN DEWEY, ON EXPERIENCE, NATURE, AND FREEDOM 271 (Richard J. Bernstein ed.,
1960).
129. John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225, 226 (1935).
130. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY 177,
183, 191 (Melvin L. Rogers ed., 2016).
131. Jennifer Bleazby, Autonomy, Democratic Community, and Citizenship in Philosophy
for Children: Dewey and Philosophy for Children’s Rejection of the Individual/Community
Dualism, 26 ANALYTICAL TEACHING 30, 39 (2006).
132. BALDACCHINO, supra note 125, at 19; see also WESTBROOK, supra note 125, at 165, 188
(discussing positive and negative freedom); Festenstein, supra note 126, at 6 (same).
133. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 48 (1935) (emphasis omitted); see also
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 103 (2010) (“To cast off relations of
domination is to live as a free person. The quest for freedom is the quest for a mode of relating to
others in which no one is dominated, in which each adult meets every other adult member of
society eye to eye, as an equal.”).
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with his conception of freedom as positive and social, Dewey observed:
“No man and no mind were ever emancipated merely by being left
alone.”134
Quite the reverse, Dewey insisted that schooling had to occur “in an
educational environment in which intelligence can be socialized through
participation in co-operative deliberation, shared enquiries and collective
decision-making.”135 Dewey was critical of a system of education that
“neglects th[e] fundamental principle of the school as a form of
community life.”136
By replicating a democratic community of equals in the classroom,
schools could be the incubators of democracy and citadels of freedom. So
organized “to promote the kind of social intelligence which is the
prerequisite to individual freedom and growth. . . . [A] democratic school
is a common school providing a broad social community to which
children of different race, class, gender and religion can belong.”137
For Dewey, “the breaking down of those barriers of class, race,” etc.,
could only be achieved through “more numerous and more varied points
of contact,” through “greater diversity,” which would “secure a liberation
of powers.”138 In his view,
Intolerance, abuse . . . because of differences of race, color,
wealth or degree of culture are treason to the democratic way
of life. For everything which bars freedom and fullness of
communication sets up barriers that divide human beings
into sets and cliques, into antagonistic sects and factions, and
thereby undermines the democratic way of life. Merely legal
guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free
expression, free assembly are of little avail if in daily life
freedom of communication, the give and take of ideas, facts,
experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by
fear and hatred.139
134. DEWEY, supra note 130, at 191.
135. WILFRED CARR & ANTHONY HARTNETT, EDUCATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL IDEAS 63 (1996).
136. JOHN DEWEY, MY PEDAGOGIC CREED (1897), reprinted in 5 THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN
DEWEY 88 (Jo Ann Boydston & Fredson Bowers eds., 1972).
137. CARR & HARNETT, supra note 135, at 63; see Yudof, supra note 107, at 458 (“[I]f an
integrated society is the desired end, the schools were the most logical as well as the most
traditional place to begin the process of integration.”).
138. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION 87 (First Free Press Paperback ed., 1966) (1916).
139. JOHN DEWEY, CREATIVE DEMOCRACY–THE TASK BEFORE US (1939), reprinted in 14
THE LATER WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 227–28 (Jo Ann Boydston & Patricia Baysinger eds., 1988)
(emphasis added); see Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME: J. SOC.
EPISTEMOLOGY 8, 13 (2006) (explaining that Dewey’s approach “represents the epistemic powers
of all three constitutive features of democracy: diversity, discussion, and dynamism”).
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These are not the ramblings of an early twentieth century philosopher.
The Supreme Court has said as much: “When that [school] environment
is largely shaped by members of different racial and cultural groups,
minority children can achieve their full measure of success only if they
learn to function in—and are fully accepted by—the larger
community.”140 Justice Marshall perhaps expressed the point best, that
“unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our
people will ever learn to live together.”141
Some state high courts have echoed this belief that “education serves
as a ‘unifying social force’ . . . promoting cohesion based upon
democratic values” by “bring[ing] together members of different racial
and cultural groups . . . [to] help them to live together ‘in harmony and
mutual respect.’”142 As one court explained, “it is not enough that the 3
R’s are being taught. . . . children must learn to respect and live with one
another in multi-racial and multi-cultural communities . . . .”143 Such
“goals of teaching tolerance and cooperation among the races, of molding
values free of racial prejudice . . . are integral to the mission of public
schools.”144
In sum, an integrated school environment is integral to the freedom to
learn of all students, the advantaged and disadvantaged alike; all stand to
be free, if all are educated together.
3. Transformative
Still to this day, Dewey’s continuing influence on American education
can hardly be overstated.145 Even his critics are quick to concede that his
140. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 472–73 (1982).
141. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 41 (Cal. 1984) (first quoting Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971); and then quoting Washington, 458 U.S. at 473); see also In re
Hatfield Twp. Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 Walk. 169, 174 (Pa. 1885) (“It is one of the most beneficent
purposes of our general system of popular education that all classes and conditions of society,
irrespective of the considerations referred to, shall be taught in the same schools. The tendency
and effect of such a system is to obliterate, or at least to solidify and strengthen, the seams which
must otherwise permeate our civil and social affairs, to assimilate our varied population, and to
cultivate that tolerance and equality which is the distinguishing characteristic of the government
under which we live.”); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1285 (Conn. 1996) (“If children of
different races and economic and social groups have no opportunity to know each other and to
live together in school, they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual respect
necessary for the cohesion of our society.” (quoting Jenkins v. Twp. of Morris Sch. Dist., 279
A.2d 619, 627 (N.J. 1971))).
143. Booker v. Bd. of Educ., 212 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1965).
144. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 162 (Wash.
2003).
145. See generally C. GREGG JORGENSEN, DISCOVERING JOHN DEWEY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: DIALOGUES ON THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF EDUCATION (2017) (highlighting fourteen
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“impact on American education is incalculable.”146 Dewey’s evolving
perceptions of the urgency of racial justice positioned his philosophy as
one of “the intellectual rationale[s] in the battle against segregation and
discrimination.”147 There were, of course, many other intellectual giants
behind the Civil Rights Movement. In an article entitled The Freedom to
Learn, the distinguished African American educator and activist W. E. B.
Du Bois boldly proclaimed:
Of all the civil rights for which the world has struggled and
fought for five thousand years, the right to learn is
undoubtedly the most fundamental . . . . The freedom to
learn . . . has been bought by bitter sacrifice. And whatever
we may think of the curtailment of other civil rights, we
should fight to the last ditch to keep open the right to
learn . . . . Freedom always entails danger. Complete
freedom never exists. But of all the freedoms of which we
think, the freedom to learn is in the long run the least
dangerous and the one that should be curtailed last.148
Du Bois “was the foremost advocate for directing African American
critical intelligence toward the solution of social problems.”149 Both Du
Bois and his contemporary Dewey considered social reform part of the
agenda for progressive or liberal education.150 That is, they saw the power
of education as a transformative process and as an institution in society.151
different scholars’ views on how John Dewey’s scholarship is still significant in the field of
democratic education).
146. HENRY T. EDMONDSON III, JOHN DEWEY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 8
(2014).
147. Charles F. Howlett & Audrey Cohan, John Dewey and His Evolving Perceptions of
Race Issues in American Democracy, 17 TEACHING SOC. STUD. 16, 21 (2017); see Virgil A. Clift,
Does the Dewey Philosophy Have Implications for Desegregating the Schools?, 29 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 145, 153 (1960); John L. Rury & Suzanne Rice, Dewey on Civil Rights, Testing, Interest,
and Discipline: Democracy and Education in Perspective, 16 J. GILDED AGE & PROGRESSIVE ERA
488, 490–93 (2017).
148. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Freedom to Learn, 2 MIDWEST J. 9, 10–11 (1949),
http://www.aspresolver.com/aspresolver.asp?BLTC;S9607 [https://perma.cc/FQ78-XU4P].
149. Keith Gilyard, John Dewey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and a Rhetoric of Education, in TRAINED
CAPACITIES: JOHN DEWEY, RHETORIC, AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE 125 (Brian Jackson & Gregory
Clark eds., 2014).
150. Id. at 128–29; see also CARR & HARNETT, supra note 135, at 63–64 (discussing Dewey’s
belief that a more democratic society could result only through the promotion and growth of
cooperation and social intelligence in schools).
151. See DEWEY, supra note 138, at 92 (“[W]e are doubtless far from realizing the potential
efficacy of education as a constructive agency of improving society, from realizing that it
represents not only a development of children and youth but also of the future society of which
they will be the constituents.”); NOAH DE LISSOVOY ET AL., TOWARD A NEW COMMON SCHOOL
MOVEMENT 65 (Routledge 2016) (2014) (“The educational theories of John Dewey, W. E. B. Du
Bois . . . [among] others have long insisted on the centrality of public schools and classrooms as
sites of democratic social transformation.”).
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Dewey held that “schools should strive to educate with social change in
view by producing individuals . . . equipped with desires and abilities to
assist in transforming it.”152 Du Bois’s writings likewise conveyed “a
nearly evangelical faith in education and its transformative power,”
harkening the “positions advanced by Dewey” and others “to create the
conditions that promoted social democracy.”153
Among the earliest progressives to put these words into action were
Black educators in segregated schools, who embraced “pedagogies of
protest,” contested White supremacy, and prepared student activists for
the Civil Rights Movement.154 Many of these Black teachers earned their
“degrees during a time when progressive . . . ideas were especially
influential” and “used Dewey’s democratic ideas to liberate” their
students.155 “Dewey’s democratic vision was popular among leading
black educators because it supported a more activist interpretation of the
African American uplift philosophy.”156
African American educators emphasized “democratic living” and
“critical thinking” for “problem solving situations,” all the while seeking
to instill pride in Black children “and at the same time conscious of
themselves as Americans.”157 They also supported and helped organize
student activism before and after Brown, from student-led strikes to
boycotts.158 A central theme was “the freedom pledge: ‘in order to have
freedom, we have to fight for it.’”159 The demand for freedom, after all,
152. JOHN DEWEY, PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AND THE SCIENCE OF EDUCATION (1939),
reprinted in 3 THE LATER WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 262 (Jo Ann Boydston & Patricia Baysinger
eds., 1984).
153. MICHAEL W. APPLE, CAN EDUCATION CHANGE SOCIETY? 77 (2013).
154. See Scott Baker, Pedagogies of Protest: African American Teachers and the History of
the Civil Rights Movement, 1940–1963, 113 TCHRS. COLL. REC. 2777, 2779–80 (2011).
155. Id. at 2785–86.
156. Id. at 2787–88.
157. Id. at 2788 (first quoting Adam Fairclough, Being in the Field of Education and Also
Being Negro Seems Tragic: Black Teachers in the Jim Crow South, 87 J. AM. HIST. 65, 84 (2000);
then quoting a 1942 Burke High School yearbook; and then quoting Aaron Brown, An Evaluation
of the Accredited Secondary Schools for Negroes in the South, 13 J. NEGRO EDUC. 488, 491
(1944)).
158. See id. at 2791–98.
159. See id. at 2789 (quoting the January 1948 edition of Parvenue, a student-run newspaper
from Burke High School (on file with the Avery Research Center at College of Charleston)); see
also JON. N. HALE, THE FREEDOM SCHOOLS: STUDENT ACTIVISTS IN THE MISSISSIPPI CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 26 (2016) (“What remained constant throughout the history of African American
education is the fact that the schoolhouse represented an institution, an ideology, and a collective
space through which to achieve full political, economic, and social rights.”); Vanessa Siddle
Walker, Valued Segregated Schools for African American Children in the South, 1935-1969: A
Review of Common Themes and Characteristics, 70 Rev. Educ. Res. 253, 276 (2000) (“In their
world, there was a clear ‘enemy’—racism. As such, the [segregated] schools operated with a welldefined purpose for African American uplift that was shared by teachers, principal, and
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motivated the Civil Rights Movement, no less so than the demand for
equality.160 Indeed, it was our collective failure to deliver on the promise
of equality that perhaps forced the pivot to liberty.
Freedom then reverberated to spirited applause in Dr. King’s “I Have
a Dream” speech in 1963.161 The following summer, “Freedom Summer”
1964, freedom was the organizing principle of more than forty
Mississippi “Freedom Schools” for Black children.162 These schools
instilled guarded hope not only in the possibility of negative freedom
from oppression, but the benefits of positive “freedom to think, to grow,
to decide.”163 To that end, Freedom School teachers “implemented a new
form of pedagogy and curriculum” that stressed “citizenship” and
“embraced dialogue, critical thinking, and hands-on activity that
transformed local civil rights protests into educative spaces.”164
The immediate objective of the Freedom Schools was not just to
integrate White schools but to develop schools “organized to work on the
society to change it.”165 It was to provide a radical example of schooling
that would challenge, not perpetuate, “the social, political, and economic
status quo.”166 That meant conceiving “education for liberation” as
“education for social change” as well.167 “As such the Freedom Schools
were one of the first historical instances of ‘critical pedagogy,’ a theory
of education based on resistance and education for social change.”168

community members. All the training and modeling by teachers and principal were aimed at
helping themselves and their students overcome that enemy.”).
160. See generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING
TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995) (noting that organizers in the Civil
Rights Movement relied on symbols and songs of the rural Black South to represent how freedom
was at the heart of their message); VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE
FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981) (arguing that the Civil Rights Movement was the “[B]lack
movement toward freedom,” accompanied with the “search and struggle for justice, equality, and
self-determination in the United States”).
161. Heard on Talk of the Nation, ‘I Have A Dream’ Speech, In Its Entirety, NPR
(Jan. 18, 2010), https://www.npr.org/2010/01/18/122701268/i-have-a-dream-speech-in-its-ntirety
[https://perma.cc/VZL2-G5CD].
162. See William Sturkey, “I Want to Become a Part of History”: Freedom Summer,
Freedom Schools, and the Freedom News, 95 J. AFR. AM. HIST. 348, 355 (2010); HALE, supra
note 159, at 34 (“The term ‘Freedom Schools’ harkens back to the ‘Freedmen’s schools’ of the
Reconstruction era and, indeed, drew upon the same concepts of education for liberation.”).
163. Daniel Perlstein, Teaching Freedom: SNCC and the Creation of the Mississippi
Freedom Schools, 30 HIST. EDUC. Q. 297, 303 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. HALE, supra note 159, at 109–10.
165. Id. at 173.
166. Id. at 3.
167. Id. at 34.
168. Id. at 211.
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Although the Freedom Schools were short-lived, they served as a
model for the “free schools movement” in the 1960s and 1970s.169 The
first school by that name, “The Free School,” began in autumn 1963, after
Prince Edward County in Virginia chose to close, rather than desegregate,
its public schools in the wake of Brown.170 Operating as a direct refutation
of “segregationists’ claims about what Blacks and Whites could and
could not do together,” the Free School was integrated and, like the
Freedom Schools, emphasized critical thinking, democratic processes,
and citizenship.171
Hundreds of free schools were eventually established,172 and,
although they had their “pedagogical differences,” many were committed
to a “loosely defined, evolving curriculum that focused on the issues of
the day, including race, civil rights, Vietnam, and women’s liberation.”173
That is, like the Freedom Schools, many of these free schools were
committed to educating for social change. This was especially true for the
group of free schools attended by poor and/or Black youth.174 That group
of free, community schools—unlike the White, middle- and upper-class
free schools—were more inclined to conceive the “free” in free schools
as denoting liberation through social change than as “do-your-ownthing.”175
Several leading free school advocates believed that social change
could be achieved only outside the public education system.176 And yet,
“the free schools disappeared as quickly as they emerged,” with
advocates learning firsthand just how difficult it was to operate outside
the system with “inadequate resources and a lack of outside support.”177
Some regard this as the significance of the free schools movement—that
even as it laid the foundation for school choice alternatives, the
movement demonstrated those alternatives might only succeed if publicly
subsidized and supported.178 They suggest progressives should embrace
those alternatives for their potential to affect the kind of social freedom

169. See James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got
There First, 93 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1299–1300 (2005).
170. See CANDACE EPPS-ROBERTSON, RESISTING BROWN: RACE, LITERACY, AND CITIZENSHIP
IN THE HEART OF VIRGINIA 13 (2018) (ebook).
171. Id. at 13–14. See also id. at 71–94.
172. ALLEN GRAUBARD, ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION: THE FREE SCHOOL MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 4 (1972).
173. Forman, supra note 169, at 1301.
174. See Robert D. Barr, Whatever Happened to the Free School Movement?, 54 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 454, 455 (1973).
175. Id.
176. Forman, supra note 169, at 1302–03.
177. Id. at 1304.
178. See id. at 1304–05.
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and change that defined the mission of free schools and could now
distinguish charter and voucher plans.179
The better lesson from the free schools movement, however, is that
democracy-enhancing freedom and social change do not come about
through separation, whether that separation makes possible a
conservative or progressive enclave. We simply cannot hope to secure a
freedom to learn for all schoolchildren by separating them.
And yet integration alone is no panacea. Du Bois himself believed that
integrated schools “with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile
public opinion, and no teaching of truth concerning black folk” could be
just as “bad” as segregated schools.180 As he would later reflect, “I was
fighting segregation but simultaneously advocating such segregation as
would prepare my people for the struggle they were making.”181 In that
persistent struggle, school choice exercised and controlled by Black
Americans could be viewed as a matter of “forced self-determination” for
a “quality education.”182
But much depends on the objectives of that education.183 If those
objectives concern only academic performance and attainment aimed
predominantly toward credentialing and economic mobility, then we can
expect the debate to continue about whether integration is strictly

179. Id. at 1313–19.
180. W.E.B. Du Bois, Does the Negro need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 335
(1935).
181. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W. E. B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON VIEWING
MY LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY 297 (1968).
182. John Hale, The African American Roots of Betsy DeVos’s Education Platform, THE
ATLANTIC (Jan. 18, 2017).
183. See generally David F. Labaree, Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle
over Educational Goals, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 39 (1997) (examining three competing goals of
education: democratic equality, social efficiency, and social mobility).
Labaree notes that the tension between these conflicting goals fuels conflicts over
the role of schools and the goals of reform movements. The democratic equality
goal represents the view of the citizen and focuses on the need for schools to
prepare children for equal participation in the political process. The social
efficiency goal represents the perspective of the taxpayers and employers and
focuses on preparation of children to become productive workers. The social
mobility goal represents the viewpoint of the educational consumer and sees
education as “a private good designed to prepare individuals for successful social
competition for the more desirable market roles.” Labaree notes that the third
goal has come to dominate, and “[a]s a result, public education has increasingly
come to be perceived as a private good that is harnessed to the pursuit of personal
advantage.”
Susan L. DeJarnatt, The Myths of School Choice: Reflections on the Two-Income Trap, 4 RUTGERS
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 94 n.23 (2006) (citations omitted).
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necessary.184 If, instead, the objectives were to include and prioritize
democratic equality and a socially conscious democratic education, then
surely integration is essential for transformative learning. Transformative
in the sense that it “transforms problematic frames of reference—sets of
fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning
perspectives, mindsets)—to make [children] more inclusive,
discriminating, open, reflective, and emotionally able to change.”185
No doubt transformative learning for democratic and social equality
requires more than integration; it demands real opportunities for inclusive
and safe classrooms, a culturally responsive curriculum, positive
developmental relationships, and social-emotional learning support
systems.186 And those components are in relatively short supply in most
segregated school settings. The bottom-line point being, however, that
the mission of education cannot just be informational, it must be
transformational to orient children in freedom and toward social change.
Admittedly, state high courts have not used terms such as
“transformative” in describing the public school settings necessary to
protect that freedom to learn. But even Rodriguez acknowledged “that the
grave significance of education both to the individual and to our society’
cannot be doubted.”187 Moreover, the notion that education should be
transformative to improve society is reflected directly in certain state
education clauses.188 It is most pronounced in Louisiana’s education
184. See, e.g., Timothy M. Diette, et al., Does the Negro Need Separate Schools? A
Retrospective Analysis of the Racial Composition of Schools and Black Adult Academic and
Economic Success, 1 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIENCES 166, 167–68 (Feb. 2021)
(acknowledging “conventional wisdom has it that attending school with white peers benefits black
students on a wide array of fronts, including their academic outcomes” but discussing “evidence
at odds with the common view that educational attainment for blacks increases monotonically
with the percentage of their high school peers who are white”).
185. Jack Mezirow, Transformative Learning as Discourse, 1 J. TRANSFORMATIVE EDUC. 58,
58 (2003); see also Du Bois, supra note 180, at 335 (“Other things being equal, the mixed [or
integrated] school is the broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth. It gives wider
contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence; and suppresses the inferiority complex.”).
186. See LEARNING POLICY INSTITUTE & TURNAROUND FOR CHILDREN, DESIGN PRINCIPLES
FOR SCHOOLS: PUTTING THE SCIENCE OF LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT INTO ACTION viii
(June 2021), https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/product-files/SoLD_Design_
Principles_REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEV3-XK3W].
187. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (quoting Rodriguez
v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971)).
188. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (obligating the state legislature to “encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement”);
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (similar); IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2nd, § 1 (similar); NEV. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1 (similar); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 12 (similar); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § II (encouraging
education “to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity and general benevolence,
public and private charity, industry and frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings;
sincerity, good humor, and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the people”);
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clause: “The goal of the public educational system is to provide learning
environments and experiences, at all stages of human development, that
are humane, just, and designed to promote excellence in order that every
individual may be afforded an equal opportunity to develop to his full
potential.”189
State high courts have likewise emphasized that public education
should cultivate “the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges,”190
equip children with “sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems” and “sufficient understanding” about “issues that affect
[their] community, state, and nation”191 such that they might “contribute
to the well-being and progress of our society”192 and their “state.”193
As the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained, “public school
students [must be] fully integrated into the world around them,” and given
“broad exposure to the social, economic, scientific, technological, and
political realities of today’s society” so that they can “compete,
contribute, and flourish.”194 Finally, state courts have also recognized that
public education must evolve to meet the changing needs and demands
of society.195
Though perhaps lost in translation, the above sources of law surely
confirm the intended, if not expected, transformative nature of public
education.
The most pressing question is whether we will, at last, name and
reclaim these neglected freedoms—the freedom to become equal citizens
and the freedom to learn in democratic, integrated, and transformative
settings. Because freedom, as much as if not more than equality, anchors
and justifies the right to education substantively.

N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“A high degree of intelligence, patriotism, integrity and morality on
the part of every voter in a government by the people being necessary in order to insure the
continuance of that government and the prosperity and happiness of the people, the legislative
assembly shall make provision for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public
schools . . . .”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (similar).
189. LA. CONST. art. VIII, pmbl.
190. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
191. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
192. Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 287 (Conn. 2010)
(Schaller, J., concurring).
193. DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ohio 1997).
194. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997).
195. See Joshua E. Weishart, Rethinking Constitutionality in Education Rights Cases, 72
ARK. L. REV. 491, 509 nn.98–99 (2019) (citing cases).
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II. REVITALIZING STATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Substantive due process is the dark-horse judicial doctrine capable of
protecting education as freedom. “There is no concept in American law
that is more elusive or more controversial than substantive due
process.”196 It seems least clear when it is most mesmerizing—like trying
to decipher a déjà vu that is fleeting and erratic, yet at once so intense and
foundational in its familiarity. “The Meming of Substantive Due Process”
as an “oxymoron” has continued since “the 1980s when legal
conservatives (and some liberals) began to lampoon it as a textual
anomaly.”197 The criticism grew harsher still, with the doctrine being
“denounced as incoherent babble on par with ‘green pastel redness.’”198
All of this piling on has ironically engendered strange-bedfellow
defenses of substantive due process—from originalists based on the
doctrine’s lineage and original meaning199 and others based on the ruleof-law principles for which it stands.200 Still, it is fair to say that
substantive due process remains a much “maligned constitutional
doctrine.”201 It is also fair to say, however, that much of that maligning
has been directed at federal, not state, substantive due process guarantees.
Indeed, scholars have paid comparatively little attention to those state due
process guarantees which could be deftly employed to protect educational
freedoms to become and to learn—more so than the federal doctrine.
A. The Federal Path Is Not Vital
The trouble is not with the federal doctrine itself, but with a judicial
ideology loath to adhere to the precedent. Scholars have persuasively
demonstrated how faithful applications of substantive due process
precedent could underpin an affirmative, liberty-based right to

196. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
197. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 253,
253, 255 (2016).
198. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of
the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599, 1603–04 (2019) (quoting JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)).
199. See id. (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J.
585, 588, 595–96 (2009)).
200. See Greene, supra note 197, at 255, 288–89; Matthew R. Grothouse, Implicit in the
Concept of Ordered Liberty: How Obergefell v. Hodges Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due
Process Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1021, 1023–24 (2016); Timothy Sandefur, In Defense
of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283,
285–86 (2012).
201. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 588
(2009).
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education.202 Other scholars have proposed fusing substantive due
process with equal protection, à la Obergefell v. Hodges,203 to underpin
such a right.204 But none of these arguments have carried the day in
federal court—at least not until Gary B. v. Whitmer.205
In 2016, Detroit public school students sued Michigan state officials
in federal court, contending that their schools were so deficient as to
deprive them of a basic minimum education, one that could, at a
minimum, impart literacy.206 Informally dubbed the “right to literacy” or
“right to read” case,207 plaintiffs asserted claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.208 The district
court dismissed their complaint on the merits and plaintiffs appealed.209
Regarding their due process claims, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered two arguments. First,
plaintiffs argued that the conditions of their schools were so abysmal that
they were virtually providing no education at all, and thus, the state could
not justifiably restrict their liberty through compulsory attendance.210 As
the court’s majority opinion observed, this was “a ‘negative rights’
argument” predicated on the students’ “freedom of movement and
freedom from state custody.”211
Although the court acknowledged that the “legal theory behind this
claim appear[ed] to have strong support in the law . . . tracing back to the
Magna Carta,” the court affirmed its dismissal, concluding the complaint
202. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 550, 579–96 (1992); Black, supra note 98, at 1078; Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What
Lawrence Brought for “Show and Tell”: The Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally
Adequate Education, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 343, 345 (2005); Areto A. Imoukhuede,
Education Rights and the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 468 (2014); Friedman & Solow,
supra note 97, at 96, 121–32; Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education
Finance Litigation: Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
989, 1016 (2010); Note, A Right to Learn?: Improving Educational Outcomes Through
Substantive Due Process, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1323, 1327 (2007); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal
Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 823–28
(1985).
203. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
204. See Weishart, supra note 48, at 973–76; Kristi L. Bowman, The Failure of Education
Federalism, 51 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 4–5 (2017); Alexis M. Piazza, The Right to Education
After Obergefell, 43 HARBINGER 62, 71 (2019).
205. 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir.), vacated, Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020)
(en banc).
206. Id. at 621.
207. Bowman, supra note 204, at 4.
208. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 621.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 638.
211. Id. (quoting Brief of Appellants at 36–43, Gary B., 957 F.3d 616 (Nos. 18-1855/181871)).
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failed to give adequate notice of the theory and, as pleaded, also failed to
state a plausible claim for relief.212 Plaintiffs had alleged insufficient facts
to convince the court that the deprivation of their freedoms outweighed
the state’s compelling interests in compulsory school attendance,
“whatever education, however negligible, they are receiving.”213
Second, plaintiffs sought recognition of a fundamental right to a basic
minimum education, arguing that access to literacy was so foundational
to their democratic citizenship that it was “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”214 The court observed that plaintiffs were seeking
recognition of an “affirmative,” or “positive right” to education on this
claim.215 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the court concluded that due
process precedent “does not foreclose recognizing [such a] right.”216
Indeed, the panel majority proceeded to do just that.
The court began its analysis by observing that existing Supreme Court
precedent recognizes that due process guarantees already include positive
freedoms, “not merely freedom from bodily restraint” but “freedom in all
of its dimensions,” including, significantly, the freedom “to acquire
useful knowledge,” that is, the freedom to learn, as well as the freedom
to become “citizens [who can] participate effectively and intelligently in
our open political system.”217 The court then explained that “a
foundational level of literacy—provided through public education—has
an extensive historical legacy,” one that is “deeply rooted in our history
and tradition, even under an originalist view,” and is otherwise “so central
to our political and social system as to be ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”218 The court also noted that, post-Obergefell, a federal
right to education could be supported by the convergence of equal
protection and substantive due process.219
It was a momentous decision—framed in part on notions of
educational freedom—that validated the judgment of scholars who had
long advocated for this outcome.220 It was also short lived. Plaintiffs
settled with state officials who committed to supporting legislation to
fund literacy programs and interventions in Detroit public schools.221 An
212. Id.
213. Id. at 640–42.
214. Id. at 642 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
215. Id. at 656–59.
216. Id. at 659.
217. Id. at 643–44, 647, 652 (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
then quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015); then quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at
399; and then quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)).
218. Id. at 642, 649 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21).
219. Id. at 656 n.16.
220. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text.
221. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Designing the Legal Architecture to Protect Education
as a Civil Right, 96 IND. L.J. 51, 76 (2020).
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en banc Sixth Circuit then vacated the 2–1 panel decision and voted to
rehear the case,222 but that hearing did not occur because the settlement
had mooted the issues on appeal.223 As a result, the decision is no longer
binding precedent.
Plaintiffs were undoubtedly motivated to settle in part due to an
anticipated unfavorable decision on the merits by the en banc Sixth
Circuit. The dissenting opinion perchance previews the reasoning of that
would-be en banc opinion.224 It is replete with all the standard polemics
lodged against recognition of federal rights grounded in substantive due
process and the right to education in particular:
1. The Constitution is a charter of negative, not positive, rights, and
that construction has persisted in the Supreme Court’s substantive-dueprocess decisions.225
2. Judges should exercise restraint, not unbridled discretion, when
asked to recognize new rights, particularly when the Supreme Court has
declined to do so,226 lest substantive due process become an open-ended
conduit through which judges can enact their own ideologies and policy
preferences.227
3. Recognition of a right to education would upset the traditional
balance of federalism and separation of powers, permitting unelected
federal judges to intrude on and micromanage the education policymaking decisions traditionally reserved to state and local authorities,
which might then stymie innovation and create a one-size-fits-all,
national education program.228
4. Recognition of a right to education would provoke a slippery
slope, compelling courts to recognize constitutional rights to food,
shelter, and health care as essential to functioning as an equal citizen in a
democratic society.229
In short, recognition of “new” fundamental rights through substantive
due process is antidemocratic and exceeds the judicial function. Whatever
the merits of these objections, they undeniably hold sway with a swath of
federal judges, especially conservative-leaning judges. Perceived as the
most moderate of the six conservatives on the current Supreme Court,
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. voiced many of these same objections
in his dissent in Obergefell.230 The notion that judges of this mindset will
222. Gary B. v. Whitmer, 958 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc), vacating Gary B., 957
F.3d 616.
223. Robinson, supra note 221, at 76.
224. Gary B., 957 F.3d at 662 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 663, 666–68.
226. Id. at 665, 671–72.
227. Id. at 665, 670.
228. Id. at 670–71.
229. Id. at 667.
230. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 694–706 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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abruptly change their perspective—so foundational to their judicial
ideology and dispositions—to recognize a federal right to education
grounded in substantive due process should be indulged, if at all, with
great suspicion.231
For the foreseeable future, Gary B. is likely to remain an anomaly.
Just a couple of years before it, a Connecticut district court squarely
rejected the argument that substantive due process afforded plaintiffschoolchildren a “fundamental right to a minimally adequate
education.”232 And just months after Gary B., a Rhode Island district
court concluded that civics education for “capable citizenship” is neither
“deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and tradition,” nor “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.”233
Respecting substantive due process, it is far time we turn our attention
to the possibilities in state courts which “are absolutely free to interpret
state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual
rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.”234
State constitutions hold the potential to protect rights particularly where
the Supreme Court has said “none exist” under federal law, and also
where, as here, “success at the federal level is unlikely.”235
B. Reflecting Backward, State Doctrine Points the Way Forward
State courts were the first to effectuate substantive due process
guarantees. Those guarantees originated from the declarations of rights
that states enshrined in their new state constitutions, most of which
“included a law-of-the-land provision placing limits upon government
interference with life, liberty and property.”236 Courts at the time, and
ever since, have considered these law-of-the-land provisions

231. Cf. Eloise Pasachoff, Doctrine, Politics, and the Limits of a Federal Right to Education,
in A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY 84, 93–98
(Kimberly Jenkins Robinson ed., 2019) (explaining limitations that preclude judicial recognition
of a federal right to education).
232. Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74, 90–91 (D. Conn. 2018).
233. A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 193–94 (D.R.I. 2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)).
234. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).
235. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1695, 1699, 1703 (2010). But see Neal Devins, State Constitutionalism in the Age of Party
Polarization, 71 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 1129, 1132–33, 1140 (2019) (expressing doubt that “there
will be a renaissance of state constitutionalism in the age of party polarization” but acknowledging
that “state constitutional provisions providing for positive rights . . . have no analog in the Federal
Constitution and cannot be lockstepped; they must be given effect through state court
interpretations”).
236. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 973 (1990).
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“synonymous with due process.”237 Although law of the land and due
process had no “fixed and precise content,” and their meanings likely
“varied with context and circumstance,” courts have understood them “as
embracing the same subject matter.”238
That subject matter, according to historical evidence dating back to at
least 1791, “had substantive as well as procedural content.”239 But that
conclusion can be reached without mining the evidence—without parsing
the sparsely recorded statements of state convention delegates or
analyzing colonial periodicals—because state courts actually effectuated
“substantive interpretations of due process before the Civil War.”240
During this antebellum period, “the understanding of due process
developed more fully in the state courts because they heard a larger
number of cases which raised the issue.”241 Federal courts, conversely,
were not yet empowered with statutory authority to decide claims arising
under the U.S. Constitution or laws of the United States.242 Among the
substantive interpretations developed in state courts were two due process
guarantees against (i) arbitrary deprivations and (ii) class legislation.243
237. James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 328 (1999) (“In its initial interpretation of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court declared that ‘[t]he words,
“due process of law,” were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, “by
the law of the land,” in Magna Carta.’ Numerous state decisions, as well as leading commentators
such as James Kent, expressed the same view.” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855))); Barnett & Bernick, supra note 198, at 1607
(“Thanks in significant part to Lord Edward Coke’s commentaries, the phrases ‘law of the land’
and ‘due process of law’ became synonymous.”); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lyons, 492 N.E.2d
1142, 1144 (Mass. 1986) (“The phrase ‘law of the land’ . . . refers, in language found in Magna
Charta, to the concept of due process of law.”); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa.
1975) (“It has been a long-standing tenet of Pennsylvania jurisprudence that ‘the law of the land’
in Article I, Section 9 is synonymous with ‘due process of law.’”); Harbison v. Knoxville Iron
Co., 53 S.W. 955, 957 (Tenn. 1899) (“What, then, is ‘due process of law,’ or ‘the law of the land’?
The two phrases have exactly the same import, and that which is entitled to recognition as the one
is to be recognized as the other also.”).
238. Riggs, supra note 236, at 992.
239. Id. at 999; see also Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum
Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 305, 317 (1988) (“A substantial number of states . . . also imbued
their respective due process clauses with a substantive content.”).
240. James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51
VAND. L. REV. 953, 967–68 (1998). “By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in
1868, courts in at least twenty of the thirty-seven then-existing states had endorsed some version
of substantive due process in connection with interpreting either due process, law-of-the-land, or
similar provisions in their own constitutions or the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.” Ryan
C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 469 (2010).
241. See Ely, supra note 237, at 327.
242. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 11 (2021) (“No provision granted federal
question jurisdiction until 1875.”).
243. See Ely, supra note 237, at 336.
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1. Antebellum Substantive Due Process
Even before state courts were constituted as such, the colonists had
contended that due process or the law of the land incorporated “a residual
guarantee of substantive liberty against arbitrary actions of government,
including (especially) those of the state legislatures.”244 Shortly after
those legislatures were brought into existence, state courts interpreted
those provisions as substantive bulwarks against arbitrary exercises of
legislative power, particularly those resulting in deprivations of
property245 but also deprivation of liberties “to pursue a calling” that
made acquisition of property possible.246 In such decisions, “judges
invoked inherent limits on legislative means and ends.”247
Pre-Civil-War antebellum courts reinforced due process restraints
against arbitrary deprivations with yet “another substantive limit on
legislative power—that due process mandated general, not special,
laws.”248 Daniel Webster’s exposition of this general law limitation was
influential:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general
law . . . . The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection
of the general rules which govern society. Every thing which

244. Gedicks, supra note 201, at 640.
245. See Ely, supra note 237, at 330–36; see also Barnett & Bernick, supra note 201, at
1614–19; Williams, supra note 240, at 476; Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the
Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth
Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 548 (2011); Charles Grove Haines, The Law of Nature in
State and Federal Judicial Decisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 643 (1915–1916) (“[S]tate courts . . .
held that the design of the government, particularly of the due process clause, was ‘to exclude
arbitrary power from every branch of the government.’” (citing cases)); Jeffrey M. Shaman, On
the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 482–84 (2005) (“As the
1800s progressed, more courts took the position that law of the land or due process clauses
prohibited legislation that arbitrarily divested individuals of property rights.”).
246. See James W. Ely, Jr., “To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation”: The Evolution of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 929 (2006).
247. Cf. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 201, at 1626. Ilan Wurman contends that many of the
scholars cited herein, e.g., Barnett & Bernick, Ely, Gedicks, Williams, misconstrue the antebellum
cases and that there was not any substantive due process doctrine under state constitutions. See
Ilan Wurman, The Origins of Substantive Due Process, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816–18 (2020).
On this question, the authorities demonstrating the development of substantive due process and
related general law principles in state courts have the better argument, in my view.
248. Ely, supra note 237, at 336 (“According to Blackstone, a law was ‘something
permanent, uniform, and universal.’ It followed that particular legislation aimed at individuals or
small groups was suspect because such laws were not general in application.”); see Melissa L.
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 255
(1997).
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may pass under the form of an enactment, is not, therefore,
to be considered the law of the land.249
Also influential were the general law decisions of the Tennessee
Supreme Court, construing its law of the land provision as intended “to
protect minorities from the wrongful action of majorities”250 by imposing
a demand that “a general and public law, operat[e] equally upon every
member of the community.”251 By 1860, more than a dozen state courts
“embraced some version of the general law reading, often citing either
Daniel Webster’s [exposition] or the general law decisions of the
Tennessee Supreme Court.”252 Antebellum state courts believed “partial”
or “special” laws, so-called class or special legislation, “represented a
perversion of the state’s proper role in society” and also “threatened true
republican government and with it, personal liberty.”253
Meanwhile, state legislatures were spending much of their sessions
passing special laws, “affecting individuals, corporations, and localities,
leaving little time and energy to attend to matters affecting the state as a
whole.”254 Special legislation thus “compromised the democratic system”
creating “a perfect vehicle for political favoritism, if not outright
corruption.”255 So, “the majority of states included some form of an
explicit mandate of general legislation and a prohibition against private
bills or specific legislation in their nineteenth century constitutions.”256
249. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581 (1819).
250. Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 483, 491 (1842).
251. Jones’s Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 59, 71 (1836).
252. Williams, supra note 240, at 463–64 (citation omitted); see V.F. Nourse & Sarah A.
Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 964 (2009)
(“Relying on ‘law of the land’ clauses in their state constitutions, state courts developed doctrinal
rules striking down laws that were not ‘general and public’ and that did not ‘operat[e] equally on
every individual in the community.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Bank of the State v. Cooper,
10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 605 (1831))); Ely, supra note 237, at 336–38.
253. Saunders, supra note 248, at 254, 289 n.198 (“Members of the Reconstruction
Congresses consistently used the term ‘class legislation’ to refer to legislation that antebellum
state courts had called partial or special laws.”); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Class Legislation, Public
Choice, and the Structural Constitution, 21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 181, 182–83 (1997)
(“Jacksonian judges and treatise writers pointed to state due process, equal protection, and special
legislation clauses to argue that states were not free to pass ‘special’ laws, or ‘class legislation,’
but had to legislate in the ‘public interest,’ or ‘for the purpose of benefiting the polity as a whole.’”
(quoting HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 33–45 (1993))).
254. Constance Van Kley, Comment, Article V, Section 12 of the Montana Constitution:
Restoring Meaning to a Forgotten Provision, 79 MONT. L. REV. 115, 120 (2018) (citing Robert
M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century
United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 276–77 (2004)).
255. Id. (citation omitted).
256. Maggie Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2096 (2020);
see Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in the NineteenthCentury United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 297 (2004).
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These state constitutional prohibitions amplified the substantive due
process guarantee of generality previously articulated by antebellum state
courts.257
A comprehensive survey of late nineteenth century decisions
regarding these general law provisions showed that judges would “uphold
legislation that . . . advanced the well-being of the community as a whole
or promoted a true ‘public purpose,’ [but] strike down legislation
that . . . was designed to advance the special or partial interests of
particular groups or classes.”258
Scholars have attributed similar meanings to this general law due
process guarantee, suggesting that it demands “impartiality,”259
“neutrality of the state, equality of individuals, and the public purpose of
law.”260 They have thus drawn obvious parallels with equal protection
principles, suggesting that generality reflects “an ‘embedded
egalitarianism’” which rejects “simultaneously the excesses of majorities
and minorities by prophylactically aligning their interests in the
legislative process.”261 Others have emphasized that general law due
process “was rooted in the philosophy of civic republicanism, according
to which government action must promote public purposes, rather than
private or special interests.”262
Fundamentally, then, general law principles were meant to “advance
the public good” by curbing class legislation that “singles out . . . for no
legitimate reason, or uses irrelevant distinctions as an excuse for treating
people differently, [and therefore] intrudes on the principles of lawfulness
because it exercises government power in an arbitrary way . . . in an
irregular manner not justified by an overarching public purpose.”263

257. See Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 688 (2014)
(“They affirmed their commitment to the value of legislative generality both by articulating a
theoretical defense of this value and by enshrining protections against abusive special legislation
in their state constitutions.”); Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special
Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 52 (2014) (“State courts first used [classlegislation] tests to implement ‘law of the land’ and due-process principles, before speciallegislation provisions were adopted.”); see also Saunders, supra note 248, at 258 (“In states whose
constitutions were less explicit, the courts displayed considerable ingenuity in finding a
constitutional basis for the prohibition against partial or special laws.”).
258. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10, 102–04 (1993); see Saunders, supra note 248, at 261;
Williams, supra note 240, at 425.
259. Williams, supra note 240, at 425, 497.
260. Shaman, supra note 245, at 484.
261. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 965.
262. Shaman, supra note 245, at 486.
263. Sandefur, supra note 200, at 307–09 (citations omitted).
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2. Guaranteed by Contemporary Standards
History records that late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century state
courts “more aggressively invalidated laws as class legislation” than did
federal courts,264 particularly the Supreme Court, which “adopted a much
more forgiving version of the class-legislation doctrine.”265 Confronted
by the legislative demands of the Great Depression later in the twentieth
century, “courts rapidly began their retreat from meaningful application
of the special law clauses” that a majority of states adopted in their
constitutions.266 Claims against class legislation likewise prevailed less
frequently, even in state courts, which continued to invoke but limited the
general law principle.267 Essentially, just as federal courts relaxed “the
means-ends-fit requirements of the federal equal protection clause,”
thereby weakening that doctrine, “state courts for unimaginative reasons
of their own followed the federal lead.”268 Still, claims against class
legislation continued in state courts and were more likely to succeed
“when a strong liberty interest was at stake” because “liberty provided a
baseline from which deviation suggested abuse of legislative power.”269
If named and reclaimed, educational freedoms to become and to learn
can likewise supply a baseline from which comparisons can be made.270
Deviations from that baseline could trigger “a warning sign” that the
political process has singled out a group for favored or disfavored
treatment.271 Indeed, deviations from weightier interests—such as
educational freedoms that are essential to democracy—would boost the
signal that a group was improperly excluded from “something that should
be shared” by all.272
A claim against class legislation asserting strong liberty interests to
educational freedoms is productive for the following reasons: (i) it
264. David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2003). But see Justin R. Long,
State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 729 (2012) (“But
the effects of these decisions fell far from the populist and progressive impetuses that motivated
the adoption of special laws clauses.”).
265. David E. Bernstein, Class Legislation, Fundamental Rights, and the Origins of Lochner
and Liberty of Contract, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2019).
266. Long, supra note 264, at 732.
267. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 982–93.
268. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 131 (2018).
269. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 983.
270. Cf. Weishart, supra note 48, at 975 (contending that importing “substantive [due
process] standards could alleviate some of the manageability concerns by providing a ‘baseline
of [educational] adequacy’ from which the vertical equity required by equal protection can be
measured and adjusted”).
271. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 983.
272. Id. at 984.
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“scrutinizes laws that establish hierarchies among groups,” and thus,
promotes anti-subordination; (ii) “the analysis not only considers
actual . . . burdens but also asks whether those burdens are justified by a
public purpose;” and (iii) it “shifts the debate away from the notion of an
equality law limited to some special sets of persons,” that is, the
recognized suspect classifications.273
There should be no question that state courts are empowered to render
such judgments. State constitutional law guarantees due process of
law.274 Substantive due process guarantees against arbitrary deprivations
and class legislation remain good law.275 “The guarantee of substantive
due process,” the New Jersey Supreme Court explains, “requires that a
statute reasonably relate to a legitimate legislative purpose and not
impose arbitrary or discriminatory burdens on a class of individuals,” or
else it “arbitrarily deprives a person of a liberty interest,” and therefore is
unconstitutional.276
Modern claims against class or special legislation are now largely
governed by those separate, state constitutional provisions prohibiting

273. Id. at 1003.
274. See Steven Gow Calabresi et al., Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018:
What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in A Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 49, 100–02 (2018) (observing that, as of “2018, thirty-seven states use a ‘due process of law’
provision, seventeen states use a ‘due course of law’ provision, and sixteen states use a ‘law of
the land’ provision, though it is worth noting that there is significant overlap, such that many
states use more than one formulation in their state constitutions” (footnotes omitted)).
275. See, e.g., State v. Sedler, 473 P.3d 406, 412 (Mont. 2020) (“Substantive due process
bars arbitrary governmental actions regardless of the procedures used to implement them and
serves as a check on oppressive governmental action.”); Johnson v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 472
P.3d 92, 104 (Kan. 2020) (“Substantive due process has been described as protection from
arbitrary government action. It protects fundamental liberty interests against government
encroachment.” (citation omitted)); J.M. v. Hobbs, 849 N.W.2d 480, 492 (Neb. 2014) (“It is
because the legislative process lacks the safeguards of due process and the tradition of impartiality
which restrain the courts from using their powers to dispense special favors that such
constitutional prohibitions against special legislation were enacted.”); People v. Canister, 110
P.3d 380, 382 (Colo. 2005) (“The prohibition against special legislation was enacted, in part, ‘for
the purpose of preventing class legislation—that is, legislation that applies to some classes but not
to others without a reasonable basis for distinguishing between them.’”); Big Sky Excavating, Inc.
v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 840 N.E.2d 1174, 1184 (Ill. 2005) (“The special legislation clause . . . forbids
legislative classifications that are arbitrary.”); Willis v. Mullett, 561 S.E.2d 705, 709 (Va. 2002)
(“[Legislation] complies with substantive due process requirements ‘if [it] has a reasonable
relation to a proper purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory.’” (quoting Pulliam v. Coastal
Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 318 (Va. 1999))); Ex parte Melof, 735 So.
2d 1172, 1201 (Ala. 1999) (“Due process and equal-protection guarantees both prohibit ‘class
legislation arbitrarily discriminatory against some and favoring others in like circumstances.’”
(quoting City of Birmingham v. Piggly Wiggly Ala. Distrib. Co., 638 So. 2d 759, 762 (Ala.
1994))).
276. In re Interest of C.K., 182 A.3d 917, 933 (N.J. 2018).
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such legislation, and not squarely by due process doctrine.277 But, again,
those separate, constitutional prohibitions are derivative, stemming
directly from the antebellum interpretations of substantive due process
guarantees reflecting general law principles.278
Adhering to those general law principles is easier said than done:
claims against class legislation present a notoriously difficult linedrawing problem because “all law singles out.”279 For instance: “When is
a law a benefit to one class instead of a burden on the class’s mirror
image? When is a law directed in favor of a mere subset of the ‘truly’
relevant class, and when is the law properly directed at the entirety of the
class?”280
Little wonder, then, that “state high courts interpret special laws
prohibitions with extraordinary self-restraint.”281 Most state courts, in
lockstep with federal equal protection doctrine, thus apply “highly
deferential standards of ordinary federal rational-basis review,” with little
to no bite.282 The few outlier courts that “have developed genuinely nonfederal jurisprudence . . . have failed to define special laws in a
consistently coherent or logical way.”283 As a result, “state courts have
tended to construe state constitutional bans on special legislation
narrowly, permitting state legislatures to enact special laws with a great
deal of discretion despite these restrictions.”284
3. Fundamentally Distinct: Education as Freedom
Yet weakened state constitutional prohibitions against special or class
legislation would not pose an obstacle to the enforcement of freedoms to
become and to learn. First and foremost because such freedoms should
be considered coextensive with state constitutional rights to education.
“The highest courts of fifteen states have previously recognized the right
to education as a fundamental constitutional right . . . .”285 Only a handful
277. “State constitutional prohibitions on ‘special’ laws currently appear, in various forms,
in the vast majority of state constitutions.” Long, supra note 264, at 721 & n.6 (citing forty-six
state constitutional provisions).
278. See id. at 722; see, e.g., Town of Secaucus v. Hudson Cnty Bd. of Tax., 628 A.2d 288,
294 (N.J. 1993) (“From a constitutional standpoint, a law is regarded as special legislation ‘when,
by force of an inherent limitation, it arbitrarily separates some persons, places or things from
others upon which, but for such limitation, it would operate. The test of the special law is the
appropriateness of its provisions to the objects that it excludes.’” (quoting Town of Morristown
v. Woman’s Club of Morristown, 592 A.2d 216, 225 (N.J. 1991) (Clifford, J., dissenting))).
279. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 1004.
280. Long, supra note 264, at 737.
281. Id. at 734.
282. Id. at 736.
283. Id. at 737; see also Blackhawk, supra note 256, at 2099 (“[A]ll the more so now that
the purpose of the prohibitions has been lost to recent memory.”).
284. Zoldan, supra note 257, at 635 n.30.
285. Weishart, supra note 48, at 933 n.107 (citing cases).
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of state high courts have decided that, although the right is important, it
is not fundamental.286 That conclusion, however, did not stop New
York’s highest court from ruling in favor of plaintiffs asserting the right
to education, even applying rational basis review.287 The remaining
majority of state high courts are undecided on the fundamental right
question but, due to the right’s importance, they have struck down laws
as unconstitutional applying only rational basis review.288
It would be, therefore, a mistake to read too much into the few courts
that have deemed the right nonfundamental or that have applied rational
basis review. In truth, state courts no longer feel compelled to follow
federal fundamental rights doctrine in adjudicating the right to education
and most have abandoned tiered scrutiny altogether.289 Courts have made
these doctrinal moves to account for the affirmative or positive nature of
the right to education “that compels, rather than restrains, state action.”290
Their improvisation has been to fall back to a “means-ends test,” which
differs from the federal doctrine in that it scrutinizes legislative ends
while deferring to legislative means; some courts also require a
reasonable degree of fit between the means and ends.291
We could expect state courts to ratchet up their ends and fit scrutiny
if the positive right to education were made coextensive with substantive
due process guarantees of general laws to protect positive educational
freedoms. This would evoke another artifact of “the antebellum period:
the vested rights doctrine.”292 That doctrine, which also derived from
substantive due process interpretations, was “used to invalidate laws
deemed to interfere with certain fundamental rights of liberty or property
without adequate justification (or ‘arbitrarily’).”293 Its logic explains the
reason state courts continue to apply more exacting scrutiny to
substantive due process claims implicating more weighty or fundamental
liberty interests.
The line-drawing problem will remain but would be less troublesome
with a firm baseline of educational freedoms to become and to learn—
even more so paired with state equality guarantees.294 And, as explained
in the next Part, using those freedoms to draw a line against segregative
choice policies should not be especially difficult.
286. See Weishart, supra note 58, at 244–57 (collecting cases in Tables A, B, and C).
287. See id. at 252–55 tbl.C (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (CFE II), 801
N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 2003)).
288. See id. at 247 tbls.B–C.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 255–59.
291. See id. at 259–66.
292. Saunders, supra note 248, at 262–63.
293. Id. at 263; see Williams, supra note 240, at 425.
294. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 252, at 1004–05 (noting “the union of [liberty and
equality] claims may be stronger constitutionally than their parts”).
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III. RESISTING THE TYRANNY OF CHOICE
Choice is the font of freedom. It is widely assumed, therefore, that
more choice equals more freedom. But an abundance of choice can inhibit
freedom, or at least diminish the gratification of being free.295 Choices
are not free, they come with search and opportunity costs.296 More
choices increase search costs—the time and effort it takes to acquire and
compare information about the options, which “makes choosing more
laborious.”297 More choices also increase opportunity costs—by raising
expectations that there is “the best option,” resulting in “lingering doubt”
and “regret” no matter which option is chosen.298 Maximizers, those
“who always want to maximize the outcomes of their choice,” are
especially prone to internalizing these search and opportunity costs and
are therefore less satisfied with their decisions and experience lower wellbeing.299
“School choice resonates,” nonetheless.300 It holds a “seductive”
force, promising the best option for all, while also appealing to notions
of individual and religious freedom, free market competition, and cultural
identity.301 The allure of choice nevertheless betrays “deep conflicts over
religion, race, immigration, national identity, and even the meaning and
content of ‘school choices.’”302 Indeed, it too often obscures an intolerant,
bitter reality.
Part of that reality is that school choice tends to sustain, entrench, or
intensify segregation.303 That is true of segregation by race or ethnicity,304

295. See Arne Roets et al., The Tyranny of Choice: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of
Maximizing-Satisfacing Effects on Well-Being, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 689, 700
(2012).
296. See id. at 690.
297. Id. at 689.
298. Id. at 689–90.
299. Id. at 690.
300. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 817 (2011).
301. See id. at 817–18.
302. Id. at 816.
303. See id. at 836–40.
304. See Chase M. Billingham & Matthew O. Hunt, School Racial Composition and Parental
Choice: New Evidence on the Preferences of White Parents in the United States, 89 Soc. Educ.
99, 111–12 (2016); ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL
SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 9–11 (2010), https://escholarship.org/
uc/item/4r07q8kg [https://perma.cc/AL68-GTLB]; James, supra note 17, at 1114–17; Julian
Vasquez Heilig et al., Choice Without Inclusion?: Comparing the Intensity of Racial Segregation
in Charters and Public Schools at the Local, State and National Levels, 9 EDUC. SCI. 1, 2–4
(2019).
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disability,305 language,306 and class,307 or intersecting disadvantages.308 It
is also true of “indirect school choice,” that is, self-segregation through
residential choices, as well as “direct school choice” through charter
schools and vouchers.309 In either case, the privileged are better
positioned to absorb or leverage the search and opportunity costs—to
successfully navigate the system “with high levels of information, social
connections, and money”—whereas lower-income families “find
themselves with fewer choices.”310
Direct school choice can thus contribute to school segregation even in
racially diverse neighborhoods.311 School segregation likewise persists in
urban areas that have instituted “controlled choice,” which, within the
constraints of law, requires “levels of racial and ethnic or socioeconomic
concentrations within particular schools.”312 Yet another cruel irony of
school choice: some “admissions and management policies” enable
charter schools to effectively “choose their students, rather than families
choosing their schools.”313
305. See Amanda S. Sen, Limited Choices: How the School-Choice Paradigm Subverts
Equal Education for Students with Disabilities, 78 MD. L. REV. 470, 492–98 (2019).
306. Black, supra note 15, at 1384–85 (citing MARK WEBER & JULIA SASS RUBIN, NEW
JERSEY CHARTER SCHOOLS: A DATA-DRIVEN VIEW, PART I 18 (2014); then citing Robert A. Garda,
Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 711 (2012); and
then citing FAMILIES FOR EXCELLENT SCHS., THE NEGLECT OF NYC’S ENGLISH LANGUAGE
LEARNER AND SPECIAL NEEDS STUDENTS 3 [https://perma.cc/7SDP-R54K]).
307. DAVID R. GARCIA, SCHOOL CHOICE 160 (2018); Halley Potter, Do Private School
Vouchers Pose a Threat to Integration?, CENTURY FOUND. 10–11 (2017),
https://tcf.org/content/report/private-school-vouchers-pose-threat-integration/?agreed=1
[https://perma.cc/VW2X-TPC5]; Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent,
15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 18, 32–33 (2008).
308. See Wendy Parker, From the Failure of Desegregation to the Failure of Choice, 40
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 136 (2012) (noting “charter schools hyper-segregated by
race/ethnicity were also overwhelmingly economically poor in student enrollment”).
309. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 241–42, 254–59; see, e.g., Erica Frankenberg, The Impact
and Limits of Implementing Brown: Reflections from Sixty-Five Years of School Segregation and
Desegregation in Alabama’s Largest School District, 11 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 33, 106 n.515
(2019) (“The consensus of researchers is that charter schools have segregating effect.”); Black,
supra note 15, at 1401–02; Billingham & Hunt, supra note 304, at 101; Ann Owens, Inequality
in Children’s Contexts: Income Segregation of Households with and Without Children, 81 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 549, 565–66 (2016).
310. See Sen, supra note 305, at 504.
311. See CLARA HEMPHILL ET AL., NEW SCH. CTR. FOR N.Y.C. AFFS., SEGREGATED SCHOOLS
IN INTEGRATED NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CITY'S SCHOOLS ARE EVEN MORE DIVIDED THAN OUR
HOUSING 2 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53ee4f0be4b015b9c3690d84/t/57336
ad87da24f10a9e2e710/1462987481246/Segregated+Schools+In+Integrated+Neighborhoods.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJ8B-TFFA].
312. Brill, supra note 10, at 390.
313. Julian Vasquez Heilig et al., Separate and Unequal? The Problematic Segregation of
Special Populations in Charter Schools Relative to Traditional Public Schools, 27 STAN. L.&
POL’Y REV. 251, 285 (2016).
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Setting aside concerns about the illusions of school choice, its
segregative effects portends to give with one hand (parents’ negative
freedoms) and take away with another (children’s positive freedoms). But
these freedoms do not simply offset—children’s positive freedoms
warrant constitutional protection, parents’ negative freedoms do not. “To
be sure, parents retain the privilege under the U.S. Constitution to decide
whether their children will receive a public or private education and, in a
more general sense, the privilege ‘to control the education of their
own,’ including directing the religious education of their children.”314
And these liberty interests are “among the ‘oldest’ substantive due
process rights” recognized by the Supreme Court.315
But parents enjoy no constitutionally protected privilege to control
which publicly funded school (public or private) their children attend.
“There is no constitutional right to attend a school of one’s choice.”316
Parents have “no constitutional right” to have their children “attend
charter schools,” for instance.317
Children’s educational
freedoms to become and
to learn
Parental freedom to select
a publicly subsidized
school of their choice

Positive or Negative?

Constitutionally protected?

Positive

Yes

Negative

No

In the constitutional order, therefore, children’s positive freedoms
take priority over parental claims for negative, school-choice freedom.
Turning then to the constitutionality of school choice practices, those that
have segregative effects offend state substantive due process guarantees
if the segregative practices either (i) arbitrarily deprive schoolchildren of
freedoms to become and to learn or (ii) specially burden or benefit a class
without a legitimate public purpose.
314. Weishart, supra note 48, at 930 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 401 (1923)).
315. Kimberly West-Faulcon, Liberty to Subordinate?, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 153, 161
(2014) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).
316. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 830 (1st Cir. 1998); accord Broussard v. Hous.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 395 F.2d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 1968) (“[W]e reiterate that ‘a schoolchild has no
inalienable right to choose his school . . . .’”); Citizens for Better Educ. v. Goose Creek Consol.
Indep. Sch. Dist., 719 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Tex. App. 1986) (“Students have no constitutional right
to attend a particular school.”); Mason v. Thetford Sch. Bd., 457 A.2d 647, 649 (Vt. 1983) (“[W]e
note that there is no constitutional right to be reimbursed by a public school district to attend a
school chosen by a parent.”).
317. Doe v. Sec’y of Educ., 95 N.E.3d 241, 257 (Mass. 2018).
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Before evaluating those arguments, it is worth noting at the outset that
the following analysis proceeds on an assumption that segregative school
choice practices constitute state action. Although not bound to impose a
state action requirement when interpreting state constitutional provisions,
most state courts have insisted on state action for due process
violations.318 Yet there is considerable state court variation concerning
the standards for state action with courts deviating from the federal
doctrine to reach some private and quasi-private actors.319 Because the
segregative school choice practices scrutinized here pertain to student
admission and assignment practices that are ultimately sanctioned and
regulated by legislatures and such matters implicate students’ state
education rights, it is reasonable to suppose that they are sufficiently
entangled with, or directly involve state action to meet the requirement.320
A. Segregative Practices Arbitrarily Deprive Educational Freedoms
It is settled: “Segregation in public education is not reasonably related
to any proper governmental objective, and thus . . . constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of [schoolchildren’s] liberty . . . .”321 As a general
proposition, school segregation constitutes an arbitrary deprivation
because characteristics such as race and class are morally, functionally,
and legally irrelevant to whether a child should have access to equal
educational opportunities.322 Yet, as a matter of constitutional law, this
does not end the matter. The constitutionality of segregative school
choice practices that trigger substantive due process analysis will depend
on whether such practices withstand judicial scrutiny.
It is, alas, not safe to presume that segregative school-choice practices
would be subject to heightened scrutiny, even in the more than a dozen
318. See John Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to “State Action” as a Limit on State
Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 853–
54 (1990).
319. See id. at 822–23.
320. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 275–77 (acknowledging “debate whether the state action
doctrine applies to charter schools” but suggesting there is “stronger argument that charter schools
are state actors given the extent of state regulation of charters as it pertains to student-related
practices, particularly student assignment policies”); see also Preston C. Green III, Julie F. Mead,
& Suzanne E. Eckes, Covenants to Discriminate: How the Anti-LGBT Policies of Participating
Voucher Schools Might Violate the State Action Doctrine, 19 U.N.H. L. REV. 162 (2021)
(evaluating “constitutional challenges that students could make to invalidate the anti-LGBT
admissions policies of participating voucher schools under the state action doctrine”).
321. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
322. See Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV.
477, 487 (2014) (explaining that such characteristics are beyond a child’s control and, when used
to exclude, it is both irrational, because the characteristics are immaterial, and immoral because
it permits others to make projections of moral superiority by claiming children with those
characteristics are inferior).
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states where education is a fundamental right.323 Indeed, several state
court decisions “did not apply strict scrutiny even when the right to
education was deemed fundamental.”324 As previously explained, this
“mismatch” reflects the “incompatib[ility]” of conventional strict
scrutiny analysis, which is calibrated for negative rights enforcement
(that is, to restrain state action), with the right to education which
demands “positive claim-right enforcement” (that is, to compel state
action).325
The safer bet, therefore, is to presume that a deferential, means–ends
standard of review would apply,326 such as rational basis review.327 That
is, the touchstone of the analysis would be whether the segregative effects
of school choice reasonably relate to, or are reasonably calculated to
achieve a legitimate, public purpose. If courts were to undertake that
analysis, as they do in adjudicating claims under the right to education,
then we could expect substantial deference to legislative means,
somewhat closer scrutiny of legislative ends, plus a demand for a
reasonable degree of fit between the means and the ends.328
If past is prologue, courts would indeed defer to legislative means as
they have in rejecting challenges to school choice practices. “In doing so,

323. See, e.g., Yim v. City of Seattle, 451 P.3d 694, 697–98 (Wash. 2019) (“‘State
interference with a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny,’ which ‘requires that the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” (quoting Amunrud v. Bd.
of Appeals, 143 P.3d 571, 576 (Wash. 2006) (en banc))); State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338,
344 (Minn. 2018) (“Substantive due process analysis ‘depends on whether the statute implicates
a fundamental right.’ If a fundamental right is implicated, we apply strict-scrutiny review, and
will only find a statute constitutional if it ‘advance[s] a compelling state interest’ and is ‘narrowly
tailored to further that interest.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (first quoting State v.
Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn. 2015); then quoting SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815,
821 (Minn. 2007))).
324. Weishart, supra note 58, at 257 n.205 (citing cases).
325. Id. at 256–57.
326. See, e.g., Yim, 451 P.3d at 697 (“In a substantive due process claim, courts scrutinize
the challenged law according to ‘a means-ends test’ to determine if ‘a regulation of private
property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose.’” (quoting Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005))).
327. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Middaugh, 244 A.3d 426, 434
(Pa. 2021) (comparing federal means–ends due process analysis as “in essence, the rational-basis
standard prevailing under the rubric of substantive due process”); Fletcher Props., Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, 931 N.W.2d 410, 420 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (“For a law to be upheld against a
substantive-due-process claim, the rational-basis test requires: ‘(1) that the act serve to promote a
public purpose, (2) that the act not be an unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious interference with a
private interest, and (3) that the means chosen bear a rational relation to the public purpose sought
to be served.’” (quoting Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 1999))).
328. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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they have permitted the political process, rather than courts, to sort out
the best way to develop and manage choice programs.”329
As for the legislative ends, proponents will defend school choice
practices as advancing both educational adequacy and equity which are
not only legitimate but constitutionally mandated ends. Again, if the
adjudication of the right to education is any indication, courts would be
inclined to accept the purported public purposes of school choice
practices; “ends scrutiny has not been used to ‘smoke out’ illicit motives
or improper purposes.”330 And, in fact, courts have rejected previous
facial challenges that have called into question the “public” purposes of
school choice programs.331
Although state courts have not closely scrutinized the motives or
intentions behind purported legislative ends in education rights cases,
they “have been primarily concerned with ‘the end product’”—that is,
whether “the state action achieves or is reasonably likely to achieve the
constitutionally prescribed end.”332 This “ends-to-fit” review insists that
legislative means be at least “reasonably calculated to achieve” the
ends.333 Scholars have thus proposed as applied challenges to school
choice practices that not only fail to reasonably achieve the ends of
educational adequacy and equity, but undercut those very ends.334
Evidence of such failure or subversion might be particularly strong at the
local, rather than statewide, level.335

329. Black, supra note 15, at 1415; see, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y of Educ, 95 N.E.3d 241, 259
(Mass. 2018) (“Where a statute does not use a suspect classification or burden a fundamental
right, is supported by a rational basis, and does not otherwise violate the Constitution, advocates
may not turn to the courts merely because they are unsatisfied with the results of the political
process.”).
330. See Weishart, supra note 58, at 261.
331. See Black, supra note 15, at 1409–10; see, e.g., Hart v. State, 774 S.E.2d 281, 292 (N.C.
2015) (concluding “appropriations made by the General Assembly for the [voucher program]
were for a public purpose under” the state’s constitution). See generally Julie F. Mead, The Right
to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to
State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703, 737 (2015); Preston C. Green III et
al., Having It Both Ways: How Charter Schools Try to Obtain Funding of Public Schools and the
Autonomy of Private Schools, 63 EMORY L.J. 303, 332 (2013).
332. See Weishart, supra note 58, at 263–65.
333. See id.
334. See, e.g., Black, supra note 15, at 1425–30 (“The conceptually and factually more direct
challenge to choice programs is that they impede the delivery of constitutionally required public
education opportunities.”); Mead, supra note 331, at 742 (“[T]he effect of a voucher program over
time may provide evidence that it subverts, rather than serves an appropriate public purpose, and
it may suggest that ‘applied’ rather than ‘facial’ challenges to voucher programs may better litigate
the programs’ constitutionality according to state constitutional education mandates.”).
335. See Black, supra note 15, at 1363 (“From the perspective of the local urban district, the
effects range from existential threats to serious impediments to equal and adequate education.”).
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This sound legal strategy scored a promising early victory in CruzGuzman v. State,336 in which the state supreme court allowed a case to
proceed to trial which challenges charter school exemptions from
desegregation requirements as violative of the state constitution’s
education, equal protection, and due process clauses.337 In a footnote
responding to the dissent’s argument, the court observed: “It is selfevident that a segregated system of public schools” is inadequate and
inequitable under the education clause.338 After nearly six years of
litigation, the legislature is finally set to consider legislation that could
potentially settle Cruz-Guzman.339
Not to diminish the significance of this victory, but there is a more
direct and dispositive argument to be made: If courts were to name and
reclaim educational freedoms to become and to learn, then it would be
virtually impossible for segregative school choice practices to reasonably
relate to, or be reasonably calculated to achieve, legitimate public
purposes.
For sure, proponents can still come to court armed with social science
research that schools of choice advance educational adequacy and equity
as much as public schools.340 And their opponents can surely present
contradictory research.341 Faced with such conflicting evidence, courts
will be inclined to defer, as they typically do, to legislative facts and
education policymakers.342 As a result, segregative school choice
practices are likely to withstand judicial scrutiny or, at the very least, limit
the scope and magnitude of any remedy.
Choice proponents cannot adduce evidence, however, that segregative
school choice practices advance schoolchildren’s freedoms to become
equal citizens or to learn in democratic, integrated, and transformative
settings. No further inference from conflicting social science research is
required: Segregation is the antithesis of those educational freedoms.
The mere act of enrolling a child in a publicly subsidized school of
one’s choice, though a measure of parental freedom, does not necessarily
exercise or enrich children’s educational freedoms to become and to
learn. Schools of choice can cultivate capabilities necessary for
336. 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018).
337. See id. at 6–12.
338. Id. at 10 n.6.
339. See Josh Verges, MN Legislature to Act on Cruz-Guzman Lawsuit over School
Segregation, PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 22, 2021, 5:13 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2021/01/22/
mn-legislature-to-act-on-cruz-guzman-lawsuit-over-school-segregation/ [https://perma.cc/5N4V
-75EK].
340. See Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 346, 397 (2018) (previewing social science research that school choice proponents could
rely on).
341. See id. at 395 n.356 (citing research).
342. See id. at 348–50, 368, 375, 381–82.
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responsible and productive citizenship, but not equal citizenship—
without the social integration achievable in diverse settings.343 School
choice programs that make those diverse settings possible could
encourage and sustain freedoms to become and to learn, if only
partially.344
But such integrative schools of choice are not the subject of this
Article, which instead scrutinizes publicly subsidized, segregative school
choice practices that make democratic, integrated, and transformative
settings impossible. There can be no legitimate public purpose for such
practices bearing the state’s imprimatur.
Harkening back to Du Bois, skeptics as ideologically divergent as
Derrick Bell and Clarence Thomas discount the overriding importance of
integrated schooling, arguing that well-resourced majority-minority
schools can be better educationally and socially for racial and ethnic
minority students because they encounter fewer forms of racism and
discrimination, have more supportive teachers, and culturally affirming
curriculum and sense of community.345 Proponents of single-sex
343. See ANDERSON, supra note 133, at 111 (“To realize democracy on all of these levels
requires comprehensive integration of significant social groups in civil society and the state.”),
116, 123–34 (explaining that social integration necessary for equal citizenship is achievable only
in settings that foster “intergroup cooperation on terms of equality…whereby members of
disadvantaged groups bring relevant considerations to the attention of agents who would
otherwise be ignorant of them, and accountability, whereby agents respond to the presence of
diverse others by expanding the circle of justification to address them as well as in-group
members”).
344. Witness the example of poet laureate, Amanda Gorman, author of the acclaimed “The
Hill We Climb” inauguration poem, who attended a diverse school of choice. See Jay Matthews,
Amanda Gorman’s Private School: A Mix of Rich, Poor, Arts and Social Action, WASH. POST
(May 22, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/new-roads-school-amandagorman/2021/05/21/36d9dd48-b98c-11eb-a5fe-bb49dc89a248_story.html
[https://perma.cc/JFL5-2R33]. One is still left to wonder, however, whether all integrated schools
of choice could advance freedoms to learn in democratic and transformative settings; much would
depend on the mission and pedagogy of such schools, among other features.
345. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANT: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 24–25, 196 (2004) (contending that Brown’s integration
strategy failed and improving the quality of education in Black schools would have been more
effective); id. at 241–48 (discussing motivations and experiences of Black independent schools);
Derrick Bell, Racism As the Ultimate Deception (Fn1), 86 N.C. L. REV. 621, 630 (2008) (“[B]etter
schooling, not integrated schools, was what the black parents we represented needed and
wanted.”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 761 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[I]t is far from apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational
benefits, much less that integration is necessary to black achievement.”); Martha Minow, Brown
v. Board in the World: How the Global Turn Matters for School Reform, Human Rights, and Legal
Knowledge, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 25 (2013) (“Justice Thomas has also emphasized that
because of their ‘distinctive histories and traditions,’ majority-minority schools can function as
the center and symbol of African-American communities while offering children examples of
independent black leadership and success.”).
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schooling and programming have likewise extolled their purported
educational and social benefits for both males and females.346
There is substantial evidence to the contrary, that integration is
educationally and socially beneficial to all children.347 But we can set this
debate aside because segregative school choice practices cannot serve
legitimate public purposes even if they can improve educational
outcomes equitably, among the neediest or most disadvantaged students.
Improving educational outcomes equitably is indisputably a worthy
public purpose. Yet it matters how public purposes are achieved, the
means as well as the ends.
Segregative school choice practices, subsidized by public funds, are
illegitimate means because they are antidemocratic. And the ends do not
otherwise justify the means because the means subvert the “core purpose
of public education to democratize schoolchildren.”348 State constitutions
impose a duty to educate, not just adequately and equitably, but
democratically.349 Segregative school choice practices breach this duty
by denying children equal educational freedom.
Children’s freedoms to become equal citizens are thwarted in
segregated schools that mark them as unequal—no matter how “equal”
or superior the facilities350—whether they are Black or White.351 The
“sense of separateness and difference” that some children cannot “be a

346. See J. Shaw Vanze, The Constitutionality of Single-Sex Public Education in
Pennsylvania Elementary and Secondary Schools, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479, 1485 (2010)
(“They contend that girls feel self-conscious in coeducational classes, but in single-sex
environments they have more leadership opportunities, receive more attention from teachers, and
participate more fully in class. They also argue that single-sex education has benefits for boys
because boys in single-sex classes do not feel pressure to act tough but instead can focus on their
studies and collaborate with their peers.”); Nicholas Benham, et al., Single-Sex Education, 20
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 509, 530–36 (2019) (discussing standard arguments for and against singlesex schools).
347. See Weishart, supra note 340 (collecting research); Jennifer Ayscue, Erica Frankenberg,
& Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, The Complementary Benefits of Racial and Socioeconomic
Diversity in Schools, The National Coalition on School Diversity, Research Brief No. 10 (2017),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED603698.pdf [https://perma.cc/55WZ-7ZRQ]; Jack Schneider,
Peter Piazza, Rachel S. White, and Ashley Carey, Student Experience Outcomes in Racially
Integrated Schools: Looking Beyond Test Scores in Six Districts, EDUC. & URBAN SOC’Y 2, 12,
20–21 (2021), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00131245211004569 [https://perma.cc/
K5A4-6Y3D].
348. See Weishart, supra note 74, at 39–40 (citing primary and secondary authorities).
349. See id. at 42–52 (examining text, history, precedents that have formulated duty to
educate democratically).
350. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954).
351. See Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382, 2405–06
(2021) (noting “social science research” that documents harms of racial segregation to White
students which, in turn, “undercut public education’s democratic-equality function”).
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part of the same community or share the same values,”352 deprives them
of the opportunity to cultivate their capacities, to cultivate their positive
freedom, and to function as equal citizens. “From a relational point of
view, social inequality and lack of freedom are one and the same,” that
is, “to be unfree is to be subject to the arbitrary will of another . . . the
state of subordination, of inequality.”353
That was the joint holding of Bolling and Brown, and it was a central
holding of the Clark decision nearly a century before: segregated schools
preclude not just freedom to become equal citizens but freedom to learn
in the democratic settings envisioned for common schools—inclusive,
open to all, and participatory.354 Segregative school choice practices
instead “promote competition, individualism, and subordination.”355
Needless to say, segregated schooling extinguishes the freedom to learn
in integrated and transformative settings as well.356
If segregative school choice practices deprive children of equal
educational freedoms, then they cannot possibly relate to legitimate
public purposes and therefore constitute arbitrary state actions in
violation of state substantive due process guarantees.357 Echoing the
words of an abolitionist, being deprived of “the right to learn,” of
education as freedom, simply cannot be called “due process of law.”358

352. John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Little Rock and the Legacy of Dred Scott, 52 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1185 (2008).
353. ANDERSON, supra note 133, at 103 (footnote omitted).
354. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
355. See James, supra note 17, at 1119; Saiger, supra note 51, at 790 (“Charter schools are
precisely the opposite of common schools. The banner of common schools is commonality: All
students, regardless of background, were to be schooled together and in the same way. The creed
of charter schools is consumerism: because students want and require different things, there
should be different institutions than can meet those multifarious needs.”); Derek W. Black,
Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445, 447 (2013)
(“Based on their track record thus far, charters and vouchers, on the whole, are not operating in
furtherance of the public good. Rather than promote the public good, they tend to promote the
individual good and operate in ways that actively undermine the public good.”).
356. See John A. Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 749, 792 (1996) (“Through association we learn to consider the effect of our actions upon
others. We no longer can act in isolation once we know each other. Conversely, anyone or
anything we do not associate with appears suspect from an isolated perspective.” (footnote
omitted)).
357. See Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878, 880–81 (Cal. 1963) (holding
that racial segregation denied schoolchildren “due process of law” given “the importance of
education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished
by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis . . . the ability to learn and exchange
views with other students” (first citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954); then
citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954))).
358. See WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART, ON SLAVERY 331–32 (Luther
Rawson Marsh ed., 1860).
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B. Segregative Practices Offend General Law Principles
Few courts have considered whether school choice programs or
practices constitute impermissible special laws or class legislation.
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,359
upholding a voucher program under the U.S. Constitution, explains
why.360 Some have construed Zelman to imply that vouchers “do not
constitute class legislation because they are general welfare benefits
available to all residents, and they do not single out a class of people for
unique benefits or burdens.”361
But Zelman’s holding does not sweep so broadly, it settled only that
vouchers do not violate the Establishment Clause.362 And even if such a
broad construction were permitted, it would not preclude a state court
from construing state constitutional guarantees to provide greater
protection for educational freedoms to become and to learn.363
State constitutional prohibitions against special laws or class
legislation surely void segregative school choice practices. At first blush,
some school choice programs give the appearance of generality. For
instance, most state laws require charter schools to be tuition free, open
to all, and if enrollment is limited, to follow a “first-come, first-served”
admissions policy or use a lottery.364 Despite this, charters, on the whole,
“educate a disproportionate number of poor, low-performing, and
African-American students.”365 Similarly, most, but not all, public
voucher programs take “a targeted approach, conditioning eligibility on
the basis of income, prior attendance at a low-performing school, or some
other measure of educational disadvantage.”366
359. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
360. Id. at 662–63.
361. Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why
the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 1032 (2013).
362. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649 (“Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause
challenges to neutral government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of
individuals, who, in turn, direct the aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing.
Three times we have rejected such challenges.” (emphasis added)).
363. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995).
364. See Parker, supra note 308, at 125.
365. James E. Ryan, Charter Schools and Public Education, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 393, 399 (2008); see Erika K. Wilson, Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the
Privatization of Public Education, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 212–13 (2016). But see Heilig
et al., supra note 313, at 278 (“Our analysis, which looked at high-need student enrollment in
charter schools relative to non-charter public schools at three unit of analysis (state, district, and
local), illustrates that the claims by many charter school providers that they are serving
disadvantaged students at comparable rates equal to or greater than public schools is misleading
when examined spatially.”).
366. Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve Desegregation, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 791, 813 (2005); see Wilson, supra note 365, at 211 n.109; Michael Heise,
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School choice programs can thus withstand any facial challenge as
class legislation either because they apply generally or because they are,
in practice if not deliberately, directed towards disadvantaged groups,
who are protected most relevantly by state constitutional rights to equitydriven measures to mitigate educational disparities.367
But not all equity is created equal. Equitable measures that segregate
are inherently unequal. That is, after all, the lesson of Brown. Moreover,
any purported public purpose of school choice practices must be aligned
with the state constitutional duty to educate democratically.368 An as
applied challenge, probing beneath any surface-level generality or equity,
could expose whether selective choice practices constitute impermissible
class legislation that lacks a legitimate public purpose.
There are several such practices that maintain or exacerbate
segregation by race or ethnicity, class, language, and disability:
• Charter schools can be strategic “about school location that serve
to either restrict access to undesired students or expand reach to desired
populations.”369
• Charter schools cap their enrollment and are “under no obligation
to expand or make alternative arrangements for additional students, not
even for needy students who live next door to the charter.”370
• Charter schools “adopt curriculum and codes of conduct that are
far more rigorous than the traditional public schools and then exclude
students who cannot meet these expectations.”371
• Charter schools “advertise and promote their school to
prospective applicants,” and in so doing, “encourage some prospective
applicants to apply and remain unknown to others.”372
• Charter schools “through their curricular focus, transportation
policies, receptivity to student needs, and capacity to serve students with
special needs,” likewise “discourage and encourage certain demographic
From No Child Left Behind to Every Student Succeeds: Back to A Future for Education
Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1859, 1886 (2017).
367. See Weishart, supra note 340, at 366–67.
368. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
369. Wagma Mommandi & Kevin Welner, Shaping Charter Enrollment and Access in
CHOOSING CHARTERS: BETTER SCHOOLS OR MORE SEGREGATION? 65 (Iris C. Rotberg & Joshua L.
Glazer, eds. 2018).
370. Black, supra note 15, at 1383.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 1384

2021]

SEPARATE BUT FREE

1195

groups.373 For instance, “gentrifie[d] families who tend to have more
time, resources, and cultural capital to navigate the lottery process are
more likely to apply and gain admission to the better charter schools.”374
• Charter schools in some states may consider neighborhood
preferences as part of the admission process, which “allows for the
creation of predominantly white charter school enclaves that satisfy the
aggregate white preference for predominately white schools.”375
• Charter schools can engage in the “practice of selectively
dissuading families during the enrollment stage,” place certain conditions
on enrollment, e.g., admissions-testing or requiring parents to volunteer,
which may likewise dissuade families to enroll, or achieve the same effect
through onerous “charter school application documents.”376
• Charter schools can also control the student population even after
students are admitted, by “encouraging already enrolled students deemed
to be a poor fit to consider different school options,” warning certain
enrolled students that they will be held back a grade if they remain
enrolled, “restricting new enrollment to only certain grade levels,”
imposing “costs, dues, and fees that amount to an informal tuition,” or
engage in exclusionary “forms of harsh discipline that have the effect of
pushing out students whose behavior does not align with school
philosophy.”377
• Voucher programs allow private schools “to discriminate against
students in the enrollment process (particularly in regard to religion),
restrict student speech, punish students harshly, deny students basic due
process, and refuse to provide special education services.”378
• Voucher programs are subject to the whims of private schools
which “can choose their students, including on grounds that would be
illegal in public schools.”379
373. Id.; Will Stancil, Charter Schools and School Desegregation Law, 44 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 455, 473 (2018) (“There is evidence that a substantial subset of charter schools
is not only segregated and segregative, but is also engaged in racial targeting . . . actively pursuing
policies with the aim and effect of creating racially segregated student bodies.”).
374. Erika K. Wilson, Gentrification and Urban Public School Reforms: The Interest
Divergence Dilemma, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 677, 713 (2015).
375. Wilson, supra note 14, at 270.
376. Mommandi & Welner, supra note 369, at 65–66.
377. Id. at 67.
378. Black, supra note 15, at 1390.
379. Id. at 1391.
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Such practices, sustaining and intensifying segregation, including
within-school segregation, overlay an already stratified system of
educational benefits and burdens that work to the advantage of school
choice recipients and the disadvantage of all other students.380 Charter
schools, for instance, “have seen a rate of per-pupil funding growth that
far outstrips public schools;” are not required to “collect the same data as
public schools;” and generally reap the benefits of less oversight and
accountability, including exemptions from teacher certification,
compensation, and evaluation requirements imposed on public
schools.381 Voucher programs likewise enjoy funding and flexibility
advantages.382
Publicly subsidized school choice undeniably singles out certain
classes for special benefits and unique burdens. But the question again is
whether this form of singling out is permissible and where to draw that
line. Preferencing school choice programs to the detriment of public
schools likely violates state constitutional rights to education.383 To make
that showing in an as-applied challenge, plaintiffs must establish “that
choice programs are actually causing or are connected to inadequate or
inequitable educational opportunities in particular schools.”384 Far less is
required to show that segregative school choice practices contravene
general law principles to constitute impermissible class legislation.
Courts should draw that line using a baseline of educational freedom.
School choice practices that exceed or maintain the degree of segregation
in comparator public schools impermissibly single out schoolchildren by
arbitrarily depriving them of freedom to become equal citizens and to
learn in democratic, integrated, and transformative settings, thereby
subverting the state duty to educate democratically. New metrics for
measuring segregation can aid such comparisons.385 A public school
control group or comparator is necessary because the state cannot
circumvent equal protection guarantees or general law principles simply
by funneling public funds to quasi-public or nonpublic actors who are
otherwise permitted to adopt segregative choice practices.386
380. Id. at 1400.
381. Id. at 1373–82.
382. Id. at 1385–90.
383. Id. at 1417 (“Public education’s special constitutional standing offers strong support for
the principle that states are prohibited from preferencing alternatives to the public education
system.”).
384. Id. at 1416.
385. See generally MARK FOSSETT, NEW METHODS FOR MEASURING AND ANALYZING
SEGREGATION (2017) (setting forth a new “difference-of-group-means” framework for
segregation measurement); Heilig et al., supra note 304.
386. Cf. Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 330 (2010) (noting that
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State courts have taken similar approaches to claims of arbitrary
discrimination in the context of class legislation, essentially merging due
process and equal protection.387 Segregative school choice practices that
deviate from the baseline are unconstitutional, either because they violate
state constitutional prohibitions against special or class legislation or
because they violate substantive due process guarantees directly. That
was the judgment of the Nevada Supreme Court when it struck down
segregated schools a century and a half ago:
Can there be any doubt but the subject of education . . . and
the question as to what children shall or shall not be admitted
to the privileges afforded by them, are matters of general
interest? No question can be suggested in which the entire
people of the state are more generally concerned. It is
confined to no class, race, or locality. All who pay taxes at
all contribute to the establishment and support of the
schools, . . . [and] all are interested in the enjoyment of the
advantages which they afford. This is a subject, then, which
most clearly calls for general legislation and none other. In
that the law in question denies the privilege to one class of
citizens to have their children educated at these schools, it is
special, and is so far void.388
To the extent that this constitutional infirmity can be cured, the remedy
for segregative school choice practices is integrative school choice
practices: controlled choice, inter-district schools of choice, universal
enrollment, strategic recruitment, or weighted lotteries.389
CONCLUSION
If separate but free is inherently unfree, then conceivably all manner
of school segregation should be prohibited. Morally speaking, that
“Congress is prohibited from acting antithetical to, or inconsistent with, equal protection” through
“the expenditure of federal funds” to private actors who may freely discriminate); Metro. Gov’t
v. Tenn. Dep’t of Educ., 2020 WL 5807636, at *5, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2020) (holding
the voucher law unconstitutional as violative of prohibition against special law and noting that
legislature’s plenary authority “relate[d] to public schools, not private ones” (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted)).
387. See, e.g., Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Rev. of N.J. Unemployment. Comp. Comm’n,
64 A.2d 443, 447 (N.J. 1949) (“While the due process and equal protection guaranties are not
coterminous in their spheres of protection, equality of right is fundamental in both. Each forbids
class legislation arbitrarily discriminatory against some and favoring others in like
circumstances.”).
388. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 354–55 (1872).
389. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR ALL STUDENTS: STRATEGIES AND
CONSIDERATIONS TO INCREASE STUDENT DIVERSITY 10–17 (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/oese/oss/technicalassistance/finaldiversitybriefjanuary2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5
DH-T2CX].
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statement is beyond credible dispute. Legally speaking, regrettably yet
predictably, it depends. Unlike federal equal protection doctrine, state
substantive due process guarantees are not limited to the traditional
suspect classes, yet they are still mostly bound by the state action
doctrine.
Our understanding of all the ways that state and quasi-state action
have perpetuated segregation continues to take shape, however, informed
by recent comprehensive analysis.390 To the extent that such actions have
resulted in school segregative practices that encroach on educational
freedoms to become and to learn, then they too should be prohibited.
All this time what has been missing in the fight against segregation is
a robust theory of education as freedom. Eleven Black teens intrepidly
laid the groundwork for that theory more than sixty years ago.391 This
Article has attempted to develop it into a full-fledged, affirmative theory
leveraging state constitutional law. No matter how morally or legally
persuasive, however, a theory it will remain unless and until it is put to
the test.

390. See generally NOLIWE ROOKS, CUTTING SCHOOL: THE PRIVATIZATION, SEGREGATION,
END OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (2020) (analyzing racism, segregation, poverty, the history
of Black education, and their relationship to the current movement to privatize public education);
JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL POLITICS AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN
CITIES (2018) (exploring how local governments generate race and class segregation); RICHARD
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